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INTRODUCTION
The Information Age is upon us. Over the past forty years, the
methods and infrastructure for delivering information have greatly
expanded. Advances in computers and telecommunication have led the way.
Cable television has been an important part of this revolution, greatly
expanding the number of information sources available to households
throughout the United States.' Far from its origins as a service with the
primary purpose of extending local broadcast signals to households whose
access to the signal was blocked by mountains or buildings, cable television
is now available to almost all households in the United States.' Over 65
percent of the nation's television households now receive video program-
ming via cable television systems.3 Cable television operators presently
have been experimenting with providing all sorts of advanced services,
1. See, e.g., Michael Axmacost, Foreword to ROBERT W. CRANDALL & HAROLD
FURCHTGOTr-ROTH, CABLE TV: REGULATION OR COMPETITION? at vii (1996) (Armacost,
president of the Brookings Institution, stating that "[t]he cable industry is only one source
of video programming for U.S. households, but it is clearly the most important."); see
generally NATIONAL TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NTIA
SPECIAL PUB. No. 91-26, THE NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT: TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN
THE AGE OF INFORMATION (1991) [hereinafter NTIA REPORT].
2. LELAND JOHNSON, TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE TELEvISION 150 (1994) (96%,
citing a National Cable Television Association report); see also CRANDALL & FURCHTGOTT-
ROTH, supra note 1, at 1.
3. Year in Review: Broadcasting and Cable 1995, BRDCsT. & CABLE Y.B. at xxi
(1996) (stating that 65.3% of the nation's TV households are reached by cable systems).
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including voice communications4 and access to the Internet.5
This Article focuses on the most basic of cable television services:
retransmission of over-the-air broadcast signals. This service was in fact the
first cable service; the legal status of over-the-air broadcast signals and the
programming they contain has been an issue since the late 1950s. At one
time, cable operators had no obligation to pay or negotiate with anyone for
the right to retransmit broadcast signals. Today, cable operators must pay
a formula-based fee to the Library of Congress Copyright Office for the
value of some rebroadcasted programming and may negotiate with
broadcasters for retransmission consent-the right to rebroadcast the
broadcaster's signal.
This Article critically examines retransmission consent requirements
which were established by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act (1992 Cable Act or the Act).6 The Act made a distinction
between broadcast signals and the programming contained on these signals,
a distinction some commentators have stated was absurd or unnecessary.7
While rebroadcast of programs is governed by section 111 of the 1976
Copyright Act s retransmission of signals is governed by the new section
325(b) of the 1934 Communications Act.' Under the new provision, local
broadcasters have two options for signal carriage: (1) they can negotiate
with cable operators and give retransmission consent to rebroadcast their
signals, or (2) they can elect to be covered under must-carry provisions also
contained in the 1992 Cable Act.' Under Federal Communication
Commission (FCC or Commission) regulations implementing the 1992
Cable Act," local broadcasters were required to choose one of these two
options by October 6, 1993, and to have subsequent "elections" at three
year intervals. Because the first three year election period ended in October
1996, it is appropriate to undertake an examination of the statutory scheme
and experience under this scheme.
This Article examines the must-carry/retransmission consent choice
granted to cable operators in the 1992 Cable Act, focusing primarily on the
4. NTIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 264-65.
5. Heat Turns Up on Cable Modems, MEDIAWEEK, May 8, 1995, at 3.
6. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
7. See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 970-71 (1994).
8. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1994).
9. 47 U.S.C. § 325 (1994).
10. 47 U.S.C. § 534 (1994). Must-carry regulations basically require that local cable
operators must carry local broadcast television signals. These regulations often also place
restrictions on this carriage, such as channel placement, etc.
11. 47 C.F.R. § 76.64 (1995). See discussion infra Part II.C.
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retransmission consent provisions." The Article first surveys the history
of cable television and cable regulation. Next, it examines the history and
initial implementation of the 1992 Cable Act to assess Congress's intent in
passing retransmission consent. The Article then examines, apart from the
legislative history, what theoretical justifications underlie a retransmission
consent provision, and lays out arguments for and against requiring
retransmission consent. This is followed by a description of the actual
experience with the retransmission consent provisions--in the cable and
broadcasting industries and in the courts--over the past three years. Next,
the Article briefly discusses the controversial must-carry provisions which
are paired with retransmission consent in the 1992 Cable Act. In view of
three years of experience with retransmission consent, the policy implica-
tions for the arguments previously raised are assessed. In essence, the
Article considers what retransmission consent was meant to do and how
accurately retransmission consent has done what was intended.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CABLE TELEVISION AND
RETRANSMISSION REGULATION
Issues concerning cable regulation in general and present issues
concerning the retransmission consent and must-carry provisions contained
in the 1992 Cable Act are best understood in the context of the history of
cable television and cable regulation in the United States. Cable television,
as it is today, is a different product from what was introduced in the late
1940s. It is reasonable to question whether the regulation which has
accompanied the service effectively deals with today's economics.13
Regulation of cable television has grown out of regulation of broadcast
television and other transmission technologies.
12. Examining the retransmission consent provisions by necessity requires some
examination of the must-carry provisions with which retransmission consent is paired.
However, a focus on retransmission consent is sensible for a number of reasons. First,
scholars and courts have spent more time scrutinizing the must-carry provisions of the 1992
Act, despite the fact that the retransmission consent was (a) more controversial at the time
of passage and (b) presently has been applied to many more broadcast stations. Second,
because section 325(b) gives broadcasters the right to choose whether to negotiate carriage
under retransmission consent or to force submission to the must-carry provisions, the options
together recognize a property right in the broadcasters' signals. A broadcaster should
theoretically only choose the must-carry provisions if this result is better for them than any
other possible negotiated result under the retransmission consent provisions. Recognition of
this property right is explicit in the retransmission consent provisions.
13. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 191-96 (1983)
(introducing the concept of mismatch).
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A. Origins of Cable Television and Cable Television Regulation
Cable television (CATV) 4 essentially began as a retransmission
service. Broadcast systems transmit signals over the airwaves where they
can be received by anyone with the proper receiver. A cable operator
traditionally took this signal from the airwaves using a normal receiver and
"retransmitted" the signal, most frequently over a cable, to subscriber
households. 5 This retransmission was economically feasible because some
areas are not conducive to receiving over-the-air broadcasts. For example,
in local areas where skyscrapers or mountains partially or fully block
signals, cable television greatly improves reception relative to the over-the-
air signal. 6 Cable television initially posed no serious threat to broadcast-
ers, since it largely expanded the range of their programming and
advertising. 7 Initial regulatory attempts reflected this view. In 1958, the
FCC, the agency charged under the 1934 Communications Act with
regulating the broadcast industry,"8 declined to exercise jurisdiction over
cable television, stating that CATV was not a common carrier or a
broadcaster covered under the 1934 Communications Act. 9 The FCC
adhered to this interpretation in a later rulemaking proceeding." The FCC
viewed cable's mandate as a "functional technology" for dissemination of
broadcast signals, not a new medium for regulation.2' In fact, the FCC
explicitly stated that they did not want to premise regulation of cable upon
assertedly adverse general consequences for broadcasting.'
14. Because the early cable operators primarily used standard (although large) antennas
to receive the signals, the technology was called Community Antenna Television (CATV).
Many of the early cases and texts discuss CATV. The terms are essentially equivalent.
15. CRANDALL & FURCHTGoTT-ROTH, supra note 1, at 1; Brief History of Broadcasting
and Cable, BRDCST. & CABLE Y.B. at xvii (1996).
16. See Willis Emmons, Note on Cable Television Regulation, Harvard Business School
Case No. 9-391-022, March 30, 1993 revision, at 1-2.
17. CRANDALL & FURCHTGOTr-ROTH, supra note 1, at 2 (cable "seemed to pose no
threat of competition to broadcast television.").
18. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 151 (1994)).
19. Frontier Brdcst. Co. v. J.E. Collier & Carl 0. Krummel, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 24 F.C.C. 251, para. 7, 16 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1005 (1958).
20. In re Inquiry Into the Impact of Community Antenna Sys., TV Translators, TV
"Satellite" Stations, and TV "Repeaters" on the Orderly Dev. of TV Brdcst., Report and
Order, 26 F.C.C. 403, para. 60, 18 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1573 (1959). [hereinafter CATV and
TV Repeater Services Report and Order].
21. See Patrick Murphy, Retransmission Consent: A Mixed Signal for Cable Copyright,
17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 237, 239-40 (1993).
22. CATV and TV Repeater Services Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403, para. 69, 18 Rad.
Reg. (P & F) 1573.
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As "distant" television signals23 were more frequently added to cable
systems, cable evolved even more clearly into a distinct product valuable
to consumers and cable television operators. Local broadcasters began to
fear cable as a viable alternative, and regulators saw potential for monopoly
and disturbance of its broadcast regulation.2 4 The FCC changed its position
and decided to regulate cable television, first by placing restrictions on the
microwave facilities serving cable operators. 5 In 1965, the FCC an-
nounced its intention to regulate all CATV systems, regardless of whether
they used microwaves,26 and announced rules to govern microwave
regulation explicitly based upon the possibility of adverse impact upon
potential and existing local broadcast stations." In 1966, the FCC
determined that all forms of CATV (including those not served by
microwave), could be regulated.28
In United States v. Southwestern Cable,29 a broadcaster protected by
new FCC regulations had asked the FCC to limit carriage of their signals
by the cable operator Southwestern. ° Southwestern Cable responded that
the FCC did not have authority to regulate cable television and the Ninth
23. Distant signals are signals carried by cable systems which cannot be received over
the air in the area covered by the cable system. Signals could be transmitted to a cable
system headend by cable, microwave, or, more recently, satellite.
24. CRANDALL & FURCHTGoTr-RoTH, supra note 1, at 2.
25. In Re Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, para. 17, 22 Rad. Reg.
(P & F) 193 (1962), affid, Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C.
Cir. 1963). The FCC also stated that they could act to protect broadcast stations, reversing
their prior stance. Id.
26. In re Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, To Adopt Rules and Regs. To Govern the
Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations To Relay TV
Signals to Community Antenna Sys.; Amendment of Subpart I, Part 21, To Adopt Rules and
Regs. To Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Domestic Point-to-Point Microwave
Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations Used To Relay TV Brdcst. Signals to Community
Antenna TV Sys., First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, para. 4, 4 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1725 (1965) [hereinafter Microwave Relays First Report and Order].
27. Id. para. 77.
28. In re Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, To Adopt Rules and Regs. To Govern the
Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations To Relay TV
Signals to Community Antenna Sys.; Amendment of Subpart 1, Part 21, To Adopt Rules and
Regs. To Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Domestic Point-to-Point Microwave
Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations Used To Relay TV Brdcst. Signals to Community
Antenna TV Sys.; Amendment of Parts 21, 74, and 91 To Adopt Rules and Regs. Relating
to the Distribution of TV Brdcst. Signals by Community Antenna TV Sys., and Related
Matters, Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, para. 19, 6 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1717
(1966) [hereinafter CATV Regulation Second Report and Order].
29. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
30. Id. at 160.
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Circuit agreed." The Supreme Court, in upholding the FCC's authority and
reversing the Ninth Circuit, addressed only the challenge to the FCC's
authority to regulate cable and not the underlying rules.32 Part of the
Court's basis for this decision was the fact that cable retransmission may
"'seriously degrade the service offered by a television broadcaster' and thus
ultimately deprive the public of the various benefits of a system of local
broadcasting stations."' In fact, the court restricted FCC regulation to
"that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's
various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting."34
Most of the ensuing regulatory debate concerning cable television in
the 1960s and 1970s presumed that cable television, like telephone or
electric power provision, was a natural monopoly. Cable rates were
regulated "to protect subscribers against monopoly pricing and to ensure
adequate access by program providers to cable channels."35 Although the
FCC did participate in some regulatory efforts to protect broadcasters, the
primary regulating bodies were county and municipal governments, who
often granted exclusive franchises to cable companies in exchange for
various concessions such as hookups for public institutions and community
programming.36 The cable industry was not enamored by the franchising
process, since it created a "cumbersome and time-consuming process of
government approval for rate increases, which discouraged network
expansion and development of new programming."
37
The Cable Communications Policy Act (1984 Cable Act)38 was the
federal government's first attempt at national cable television policy. This
law explicitly deregulated cable rates in areas where there was "effective
competition. ''3' However, because "effective competition" was broadly
defined to include any franchise area where three or more unduplicated
broadcasting signals were available within a cable operator's service area,
31. Southwestern Cable v. United States, 378 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S.
157 (1968).
32. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 161.
33. Id. at 175 (citing Microwave Relays First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, para.
48, 4 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1725).
34. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 178.
35. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 2.
36. Id. at 3. For more information on the economics of franchising, see Mark A. Zupan,
The Efficacy of Franchising Bidding Schemes in the Case of Cable Television: Some
Systematic Evidence, 32 J.L. & ECoN. 401 (1989).
37. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 3.
38. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
39. 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2) (1994).
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almost all cable systems qualified for rate deregulation."0 Cable prices
generally rose throughout the 1980s as a result.41 Price increases led cable
consumers and policymakers to call for reregulation of the industry.
Consumer dissatisfaction led first to a stricter FCC standard for competition
and later to the 1992 Cable Act,42 enacted by Congress over President
Bush's veto.4 
3
B. The Two Sides of Retransmission Regulation
As discussed above, issues of retransmission have been a persistent
feature of broadcast regulation. The FCC has dealt with the question of
retransmission since it began to regulate cable television in the early 1960s.
Two different interests are present in regard to retransmission: (1) the right
of the broadcasters in the broadcast signal, and (2) the copyright of the
creator of works contained in the signal. This part surveys the history of the
two different retransmission interests and their regulatory schemes leading
up to the 1992 Cable Act.
1. Regulation to Protect Broadcasters
The first interest the FCC recognized in terms of retransmission
regulation-reflecting its historical perspective-is that of the broadcasters.
The basic theory behind this regulation was that broadcasters, having been
granted an exclusive right by the FCC to broadcast over the limited
broadcast spectrum, might be threatened if others could easily duplicate
these broadcasts." Broadcasters claimed that since cable operators did not
have to pay for any of the costs of producing the broadcast signal, cable
operators had a competitive advantage which would eventually lead to the
destruction of the broadcast television industry.4"
Concern for broadcasters' signals was clearly stated in the Commumi-
cations Act of 1934 vis-a-vis other broadcasters. Section 325 of the original
act states, in relevant part, that "No person within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall knowingly utter or transmit... any false or fraudulent
signal of distress ... nor shall any broadcasting station rebroadcast the
program or any part thereof of another broadcasting station without the
40. JoHNsoN, supra note 2, at 4.
41. Id.
42. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
43. See infra Part II for more discussion of the legislative history of the 1992 Cable Act.
44. Murphy, supra note 21, at 239.
45. The merits of this claim are not clear and are critically addressed in Part III.B.
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express authority of the originating station."46 Broadcasters may not
retransmit another broadcaster's signal without obtaining prior consent. This
ensures that one broadcaster does not infringe upon another broadcaster's
FCC granted right to transmit its broadcast signal.47 Section 325 could
equally have applied to retransmission by nonbroadcasters, such as cable
operators,4" but the FCC explicitly declined to follow this view.
49
At least one case examined broadcast rights in the absence of FCC
regulation. In Cable Vision v. KUTV,5" a federal district court in Idaho was
faced with a situation where a cable operator was clearly competing with
the only local television station, KLIX, which had secured exclusive rights
from the networks under section 325(a) to rebroadcast signals from Salt
Lake City. However, only one signal was rebroadcast at any one time.
Cable Vision set up a system which could retransmit all of the Salt Lake
City channels at once. Cable Vision sued KLDg on antitrust grounds, and
KLIX countersued claiming tortious interference with contract. The court
granted KLD( an injunction on the tortious interference grounds although
stating that any specific property right by KLIX was derived solely from
contract.51 The court did not recognize any other property right.
Partly because of its initial understanding of cable television's role and
its own jurisdiction,52 the FCC initially declined to regulate retransmission
of broadcast signals by cable operators.53 In its 1959 proceedings, the FCC
recommended that Congress pass legislation (1) requiring cable systems to
obtain the consent of broadcasters to retransmit (retransmission consent) and
(2) requiring cable systems to "carry the signal of the local station ... if
the local station so requests"'54 (must-carry). Congress did not act in
response to the request. Once the FCC did decide to regulate cable
television, partly because of the perceived threat to broadcast television, the
FCC relied upon a series of rules regarding when and how cable operators
46. 47 U.S.C. § 325(a) (1994).
47. Murphy, supra note 21, at 238.
48. See 68 CONG. REC. 2880 (1926) (statement of Senator Clarence C. Dill (D-Wash.),
during debate on section 28 of the 1927 Radio Act, later codified as 47 U.S.C.§ 325).
49. CATVand TVRepeater Services Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403, para. 65, 18 Rad.
Reg. (P & F) 1573 (1959). The FCC based its reasoning partly on a reference to radio in
Senator Dill's comments. In the rulemaking proceeding, broadcasters had been specifically
asking for a property right in their signals.
50. Cable Vision, 211 F. Supp. 47 (D. Idaho 1962), vacated for failure ofjoinder, 335
F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
51. Id. at 54.
52. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
53. CATV and TV Repeater Services Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403, para. 67, 18
Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1573.
54. Id. para. 94.
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could retransmit broadcast signals. These rules were called must-carry,
distant signal rules, and syndicated program exclusivity rules. The FCC did
not create a property right for local television broadcasters' signals similar
to the rights that broadcasters generally had regarding other broadcasters'
signals.
The first regulations were promulgated in the mid-1960s. These stated
that (1) CATV systems were required to transmit to their subscribers the
signals of any station into whose service area they have brought competing
signals (must-carry)5 5 and (2) importation of distant signals into the 100
largest television markets was prohibited without FCC approval of its
necessity. 6 The FCC also promulgated nonduplication rules and again
asked Congress to pass a cable analog to section 325(a) and to prohibit
cable-originated programming. Again Congress did not act. The regulations
were challenged and upheld in Southwestern Cable.17 "The practical effect
of the rules was to freeze most cable retransmission of distant signals."58
These rules were revised and reissued in 1972, adding rules regarding
syndicated program exclusivity, which gave local television stations that had
purchased exclusive exhibition rights and copyright holders, the ability to
demand that local cable systems delete a program from retransmitted distant
signals. 9 Cable operators persistently fought these regulations.
55. Microwave Relays First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, paras. 85-92,4 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1725 (1965). These were expanded to all cable systems in 1966. CATV
Regulation Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, para. 48, 6 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1717 (1966). For a more detailed examination of the history of must-carry regulations, see
Marc Peritz, Turner Broadcasting v. FCC: A First Amendment Challenge to Cable Television
Must-Carry Rules, 3 WM. & MARY BiLL OF Rrs. 1. 715 (1994).
56. CATVRegulation Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, para. 141,6 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1717. Some have called these regulations retransmission consent regulations,
because the consent of the FCC is required for retransmission. Here the term "retransmission
consent' is used solely in the manner used in the 1992 Cable Act--to mean consent between
broadcaster and cable operator regarding retransmission--to avoid confusion.
57. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
58. PATRY, supra note 7, at 930. The FCC did propose retransmission consent between
broadcast stations and cable operators as an alternative to the must-carry regulations in 1968.
In re Amendment of Pt. 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regs. Relative to
Community Antenna TV Sys., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15
F.C.C.2d 417, para. 38, 14 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 765 (1968). However, commentators have
noted that this proposal was not an effort "to allow broadcasters to bargain over the value
of their programming, but to give broadcasters a tool to prevent distant signal importation."
Loma Veraldi, Newscasts as Propeny: Will Retransmission Consent Stimulate Production
of More Local Television News?, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 469, 481 (1994).
59. In re Amendment of Pt. 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regs.
Relative to Community Antenna TV Sys., Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, para. 60, 24
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1501 (1972).
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2. The Second Interest: Copyright
A second interest was recognized as being at stake in the retransmis-
sion process. Owners of the copyright in programs shown on television felt
that while broadcasters had paid for the privilege of showing their works,
cable companies had not. Retransmission of broadcasts raised the issue of
property rights in the programming carried on the broadcast signal. The
1909 Copyright Act did not explicitly address the issue of retransmission
of copyrighted works.60 Court cases, in fact, established that under the
terms of the 1909 Copyright Act, retransmission was not a performance and
thus no liability was incurred.
In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television Inc.,61 the Supreme
Court took its initial view of the copyright liability surrounding retransmis-
sion of broadcast television by cable operators. In Fortnightly, a motion
picture copyright holder brought suit against a cable operator alleging
copyright violations. The copyright holder noted that although the television
stations had licenses, the cable operator did not. The Court found that
retransmission of the local broadcast signal was not "performance" and thus
no violation.62 The Court noted that "both broadcaster and viewer play
crucial roles in the total television process;" and viewers of performances
do not perform.63 The Court's point was that a cable system was like the
homeowner who put a large antenna outside his house and then connected
his neighbors as well. The Court said in dicta that "[t]he function of CATV
systems has little in common with the function of broadcasters. CATV
systems do not in fact broadcast or rebroadcast. Broadcasters select the
programs to be viewed; CATV systems simply carry, without editing,
whatever programs they receive. ' 64
The Court revisited the copyright question in Teleprompter Corp. v.
Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc.65 In this case, the appeals court had
made a distinction between signals already in the community and those that
were distant, and allowed copyright liability for the latter.66 The Supreme
Court rejected this view and reaffirmed the holding in Fortnightly.67
Justices Blackmun, Douglas, and Burger dissented.
60. This is not surprising, given the fact that radio became popular in the 1920s and that
television was not invented until 1929 and only became popular in the 1950s.
61. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
62. Id. at 399.
63. Id. at 398-99.
64. Id. at 400.
65. Teleprompter, 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
66. Id. at 401.
67. Id. at 414.
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This outcome was by no means certain. In Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle
Realty Co.,68 the Supreme Court examined an analogous question in regard
to radio broadcasts and found copyright liability. In that case, the Court
found that a hotel which rebroadcast radio signals to its guests was involved
in a "public performance."
In 1976, Congress revised the Copyright Act and expressly addressed
cable retransmission. Section 111 established a compulsory licensing
scheme. Under this scheme cable operators are allowed to simultaneously
retransmit programming but are required to compensate copyright owners
for the programming based on a complex formula including gross receipts
paid by subscribers to the cable system for the retransmission service and,
for larger systems, "distant signal equivalents," which is described as
"nonnetwork television programming carried... beyond the local service
area of the primary transmitter of such programming."' 6 Passage of this
legislation was contentious. The legislation did not require any payment for
retransmission of local over-the-air signals or retransmission of distant
network programming, based on the presumption that neither of these
harmed copyright owners.70 Payments under the 1976 Act are made only
to copyright owners and not to broadcasters (except to the extent that they
own copyrights).
The 1976 Copyright Act's treatment of cable television was widely
criticized. Some claimed that the legislation should have contained "full
copyright liability" and that the Act precluded the use of the market to set
appropriate prices for the copyrighted materials."
3. Post 1976 Regulation
Partly in response to the 1976 Copyright Act, the FCC began to
change its cable regulations. In November 1976, the FCC began looking
into abolishing the syndicated exclusivity rules,72 which were repealed in
68. Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 111(f) (1994).
70. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 86 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5700;
see also PATRY, supra note 7, at 937-38.
71. See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen et al., Copyright Liability for Cable Television:
Compulsory Licensing and the Coase Theorem, 21 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1978); Gillis L. Heller,
Comment, Regulatory Versus Property Rights Solutions for the Cable Television Problem,
69 CAL. L. REV. 527 (1981); Susan C. Greene, The Cable Television Provisions of the
Revised Copyright Act, 27 CATH. U. L. REv. 263 (1978); Leslie A. Swackhammer, Cable-
Copyright: The Corruption of Consensus, 6 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 283, 317-18
(1984). See also infra Part IllI.B.2.a.
72. In re Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, Notice of Inquiry, 61
F.C.C.2d 746 (1976) [hereinafter Syndex Report and Order], modified in Report and Order,
79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980).
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1981 despite a court challenge.73 The Copyright Royalty Tribunal,74
which administered the rates, made adjustments to reflect the regulatory
changes. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal eliminated the adjustments when
the FCC reinstated syndicated exclusivity rules in 1990.
In Maltrite TV v. FCC, petitioners tried to keep the FCC from
repealing certain regulations protecting broadcasters by claiming that the
1976 Copyright Act forbade these changes.7" However, petitioners also
tried to claim that retransmission consent, which had been suggested to the
FCC by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA)76 as an effective replacement for the regulations, would not violate
the 1976 Act.77 Although the court refused to keep the FCC from changing
the rules,78 the court seemed to say that FCC-imposed retransmission
consent would be the same as full copyright liability, which Congress had
expressly rejected.79 However, the court refused to decide conclusively
whether retransmission consent would be permissible under the Communi-
cations Act.8"
Further developments in cable regulation occurred during the 1980s.
In 1985, the D.C. Circuit invalidated the must-carry regulations as a
violation of cable operators' First Amendment rights.81 The FCC responded
with reformulated rules, but these were also found to violate the First
Amendment. 2 Retransmission consent was proposed in addition to or
instead of the compulsory licensing scheme a number of times.83
C. Summary
The history of cable retransmission regulation had two components
leading up to the 1992 Cable Act. One had its origin in the protection of
73. Maltrite TV v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981) (addressing FCC rules issued in
Syndex Report and Order).
74. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal was abolished in 1993 and its duties were
reassigned to the Librarian of Congress. PATRY, supra note 7, at 963 n.406.
75. Maltrite TV, 652 F.2d at 1147.
76. Loma Veraldi, Note, Cable Television's Compulsory License: An Idea Whose Time
Has Passed?, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 925, 945 n.137 (1980) (citing a 1979 NTIA Petition
for Rulemaking regarding Retransmission Consent and Two-Tier Structure for Cable
Carriage of Non-network Programs).
77. Maltrite TV, 652 F.2d at 1146.
78. Id. at 1147-48.
79. Id. at 1148.
80. Id. at 1148 n.ll.
81. Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1169 (1986).
82. Century Communications v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1032 (1988).
83. See Veraldi, supra note 76, at 946-47.
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broadcasters. This has been exemplified by FCC regulations including the
must-carry regulations and other protective regulations imposed by the FCC
since the 1960s. However, in 1985, the must-carry regulations were struck
down by the courts as a First Amendment violation. The other issue was
copyright, which was based on trying to protect the owners of copyrighted
works. This was resolved (somewhat) by the compulsory licensing
contained in section 111 of the 1976 Copyright Act. The 1992 Cable Act
would only firther complicate things.
II. THE 1992 CABLE ACT
The 1992 Cable Act, passed by Congress on October 5, 1992, as the
only law passed over President Bush's veto,8 4 once again changed the
delicate balance of rules regarding cable retransmission and, in fact,
changed the entire regulatory scheme regarding cable television. The main
impact of the law regarding retransmission was to reimpose, by law, the
must-carry regulations and to finally impose retransmission consent.
However, these new provisions did not replace the compulsory licensing
scheme, as some commentators had advocated. Instead, these provisions
were laid on top of the old scheme and the legislation clearly stated that the
new provisions were not to affect rights under the old provisions.
The purpose of this Part is to examine the history behind the portion
of the 1992 Cable Act which implemented the retransmission consent and
must-carry provisions. This Part introduces the arguments and rhetoric
which existed during the formation and initial implementation of the 1992
Act without critically examining the arguments or assertions made. Part III
provides a more critical examination of many of these arguments.
A. Context of the 1992 Cable Act
Legislation does not evolve in a vacuum. The 1992 Cable Act85 was
passed largely in response to consumer rage over rising cable rates and poor
customer service16 which had resulted after the 1984 Cable Act 7
deregulated rates. As a result, much of the Act reregulated basic tier cable
rates, making it much more difficult to escape rate regulation by claiming
84. The override vote was 74-25 in the Senate and 308-114 in the House. Randy
Sukow, Congress Reregulated Cable, BRDcsT., Oct. 12, 1992, at 3.
85. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
86. See Veraldi, supra note 76, at 485.
87. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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there was "effective competition.""8 The Act encouraged competition by
reducing the ability of local governments to grant exclusive franchises, 9
increased consumer protections," as well as instituted the retransmission
consent l and must-carry provisions.92
The retransmission consent and must-carry provisions had legislative
precursors. In 1989, CBS-a major broadcast network-proposed an idea
called must-carry, must-pay.93 In 1990 Senator Daniel Inouye (D-Haw.)
introduced a bill including these ideas.94 This legislation would have given
cable systems the "option" not to carry local commercial signals, however,
if they did carry the signals, they were required to pay a retransmission fee
to the FCC, which was set by a formula and subsequently distributed to
broadcasters, networks, and copyright holders, and to follow must-carry
regulations.95
During consideration of the 1992 Cable Act, Broadcasting (later
Broadcasting & Cable) -a major industry newspaper--noted a survey
conducted by the Roper Organization which supported the broadcasters
claim that the "cable operators [were] making money on the backs of the
network's [sic]. ' '96 In this survey, two-thirds of all cable subscribers said
that they would cancel their subscriptions if the three major networks were
not carried. Eighty-four percent said that their subscription rates should at
least be cut in half.97
B. Legislative History of 1992 Cable Act
Much of the 1992 Cable Act dealt with protecting consumers.9"
88. 1992 Cable Act, § 3, 106 Stat. at 1460 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2) (1994)).
89. Id. §§ 7, 18, 24, 106 Stat. at 1483, 1493, 1500 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 541, 546,
555 (1994) (respectively)).
90. Id. §§ 8, 19, 20, 106 Stat. at 1484, 1494, 1497 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 552, 548,
551 (1994) (respectively)).
91. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b).
92. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (1994). Section 535 deals with non-commercial educational
stations, which are not covered by the retransmission consent provisions.
93. Must Carry, Must Pay in the Works: Broadcasters Discussing Copyright Plan,
BRDcsT., June 19, 1989, at 29.
94. Cable Subscriber Protection and Broadcast Retransmission Act of 1990, S. 2357,
101st Cong. (1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. REc. S3400-06 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1990)
(including statement of Sen. Inouye, text of S. 2357, section-by-section analysis, and letter
from the National Association of Broadcasters).
95. 136 CONG. REc. S3404-05 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1990). This proposal was in many
ways patterned after the cable compulsory copyright.
96. Joe Flint, ABC, CBS, and NBC Important to Cable Subscribers, BRDCST., May 6,
1991, at 42 (quoting Network Television Association president Peter Chrisanthopoulos).
97. Id.
98. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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However, the formal and informal legislative history surrounding the Act
also addressed issues relating to retransmission consent. The retransmission
consent provisions were among "the most controversial parts of the Act."99
Section 2 of the Act laid out five explicit statements of policy for the Act:
(1) promote the availability... of a diversity of views and information
through cable television and other video distribution media;
(2) rely on the marketplace... to achieve that availability;
(3) ensure cable operators continue to expand, where economically
justified, their capacity and the programs offered over their cable
systems;
(4) where cable television systems are not subject to effective
competition, ensure that consumer interests are protected...; and
(5) ensure that cable television operators do not have undue market
power vis-a-vis video programmers and consumers.'
Many of these relate to the competition and consumer protection aspects.
However, fourteen of the twenty-one findings also listed in section 2
explicitly address retransmission consent and must-carry.101 The findings
99. Nicholas W. Allard, The 1992 Cable.Act: Just the Beginning, 15 HASTINGS CoMM.
& ENT. L.J. 305, 333 (1993). This article provides an excellent summary of the 1992 Cable
Act and is the basis for much of this Part.
100. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 2(b), 106 Stat. 1460, 1463.
101. Id. § 2(a), 106 Stat. at 1460-63 lists the following:
(8) The Federal Government has a substantial interest in making all nonduplicative
local public television services available on cable systems....
(9) The Federal Government has a substantial interest in having cable systems
carry the signals of local commercial television stations because the carriage of such
signals is necessary to serve the goals.. .of providing a fair, efficient, and equitable
distribution of broadcast services.
(10) A primary objective and benefit of our Nation's system of regulation of
television broadcasting is the local origination of programming....
(12) ... There is a substantial govermnental interest in promoting the continued
availability of such free television programming, especially for viewers who are unable
to afford other means of receiving programming.
(13) As a result of the growth of cable television, there has been a marked shift
in market share from broadcast television to cable television services.
(15) A cable television system which carries the signal of a local television
broadcaster is assisting the broadcaster to increase its viewership, and thereby attract
additional advertising revenues that otherwise might be earned by the cable system
operator....
(16) As a result.. .the economic viability of free local broadcast television.. .will
be seriously jeopardized.
(19) At the same time, broadcast programming that is carried remains the most
popular programming on cable systems .... Cable systems, therefore, obtain great
benefits from local broadcast signals which, until now, they have been able to obtain
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indicate that Congress had some purpose in preserving local broadcast-
ing, 02 in preserving "free" television, 3 and in establishing a competi-
tive and economic balance between cable and broadcast operators. 1' 4
While by no means determinative,05 these statements do give some
indication as to the purposes Congress had in passing the retransmission and
must-carry provisions.
The remainder of this subpart discusses direct and indirect legislative
history related to the 1992 Cable Act.
1. Treatment by the House
Members of Congress knew that retransmission consent would be
highly controversial. In fact, although the provision existed in the Senate
bill, 106 the provision was explicitly left out of the companion House
bill0 7 in order to avoid a jurisdictional dispute between the House Energy
and Commerce Committee, which had jurisdiction over cable issues, and the
House Judiciary Committee, which had jurisdiction over copyright matters.
The House Judiciary Committee viewed the provision as related to the cable
compulsory copyright provisions in 17 U.S.C. § 111 and was considering
legislation to modify the compulsory copyright.'08 Referral to the Judicia-
without the consent of the broadcaster or any copyright liability. This has resulted in
an effective subsidy of the development of cable by local broadcasters. While at one
time, when cable systems did not attempt to compete with local broadcasters for
programming, audience, and advertising, this subsidy may have been appropriate, it is
so no longer and results in a competitive imbalance between the 2 industries.
102. Id. § 2(a)(8)-(11), 106 Stat. at 1461. This argument is discussed in greater detail
infra Part III.B.1.
103. Id. § 2(a)(12), 106 Stat. at 1461. This argument is discussed in greater detail infra
Part III.B.1.
104. Id. § 2(a)(13)-(19), 106 Stat. at 1462-63. This argument is discussed in greater detail
infra Part III.B.1.
105. In fact, these statements of policy most likely reflect the fact that Congress knew
these provisions were controversial and likely to be challenged and included the statements
strictly as an attempt to ward off challenges. Indeed, the must-carry and retransmission
consent provisions were challenged in court on the day after the bill was enacted. The
validity of these findings was one issue the courts eventually considered in Turner Broad-
casting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (1993), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445
(1994), regarding must-carry.
There are other indications that Congress was aware that these sections were likely to
be challenged. Section 23 of the 1992 Cable Act amended the Communications Act of 1934
so that challenges regarding the must-carry provisions would be heard first by a three-judge
panel of district court judges with appeal directly to the Supreme Court. 47 U.S.C. § 555(c)
(1994).
106. S. 12, 102d Cong. (1991).
107. H.R. 4850, 102d Cong. (1992).
108. Allard, supra note 99, at 337. In fact, hearings were held by the House Subcommit-
tee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration to consider modifying the
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ry Committee "would have killed the chances of passing cable legislation
in the 102d Congress, and certainly would have eliminated the possibility
of Retransmission Consent becoming law."'" Nevertheless, seven mem-
bers of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, while noting the
political motives behind not including the retransmission consent provision,
filed a three page statement of additional views stating their preference that
the provision be included in the final legislation."' The House bill did
contain a must-carry provision,"' which would have applied without
choice of retransmission consent.
2. Conference Committee Report
The Conference Committee adopted the Senate language. 12 The
conferees additionally mentioned that the compulsory copyright license in
17 U.S.C. § 111 was "undisturbed" by the legislation, and added language
in the legislation so stating."' The retransmission provision states that "no
cable system or other multichannel video programming distributor shall
retransmit the signal of a broadcasting station, or any part thereof,
except-(A) with the express authority of the originating station; or (B)
pursuant to [the must-carry provisions], in the case of a station [so]
electing."" 4 The provisions also state that retransmission consent does not
apply to noncommercial stations or certain satellite broadcasts and
superstation broadcasts. Furthermore, they directed an FCC rulemaking
implementing the provisions, and noted that election periods for broadcast-
compulsory copyright to include payments to broadcasters for signals retransmitted. See also
H.R. 4511, 102d Cong. (1992). This is a very different approach from the retransmission
consent provision contained in the 1992 Cable Act. The bill was never acted upon by the
full Judiciary Committee.
109. Allard, supra note 99, at 337. As Allard explains, "without a negative vote in the
House in either Committee or on the floor, the House Conferees chosen from the Energy and
Commerce Committee would be able to agree to the Senate Amendment to add Retransmis-
sion Consent to the legislation." See also THE 1992 CABLE ACT: LAW & LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 255-56 (Robert E. Emeritz et al. eds., Pike & Fisher 1992) [hereinafter 1992
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
110. H.R. REP. No. 102-628, at 169-71, reprinted in 1992 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 109, at 431-33 (additional views of Reps. Eckart, Lehman, Tauzin, Lent, Fields,
McMillan (N.C.), and Holloway).
111. H.R. 4850, 102d Cong. § 5 (1992).
112. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-862, at 76, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1231, 1258.
113. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(6) (amending the Communications Act of 1934) (amending the
Communications Act of 1934) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed as modifying the
compulsory copyright license established in Section 111 of title 17, United States Code, or
as affecting existing or future video programming lice6nsing agreements between broadcasting
stations and video programmers.").
114. 47 U.S.C. 325(b)(1).
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ers to choose between retransmission consent and the must-carry provisions
would begin within one year of enactment and thereafter every three years.
Finally, the provision states that if a broadcaster elects for retransmission
consent, the must-carry provisions do not apply, and that such election does
not supersede the rights of any station which has chosen must-carry."'
115. The full text of section 325(b) is given below:
(b) Consent to retransmission of broadcasting station signals.
(1) Following the date that is one year after the date of enactment of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, no cable system or other
multichannel video programming distributor shall retransmit the signal of a broadcasting
station, or any part thereof, except-
(A) with the express authority of the originating station; or
(B) pursuant to section 614, in the case of a station electing, in accordance with this
subsection, to assert the right to carriage under such section.
(2) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to-
(A) retransmission of the signal of a noncommercial broadcasting station;
(B) retransmission directly to a home satellite antenna of the signal of a broadcasting
station that is not owned or operated by, or affiliated with, a broadcasting network, if
such signal was retransmitted by a satellite carrier on May 1, 1991;
(C) retransmission of the signal of a broadcasting station that is owned or operated
by, or affiliated with, a broadcasting network directly to a home satellite antenna, if the
household receiving the signal is an unserved household; or
(D) retransmission by a cable operator or other multichannel video programming
distributor of the signal of a superstation if such signal was obtained from a satellite
carrier and the originating station was a superstation on May 1, 1991.
For purposes of this paragraph, the terms "satellite carrier", "superstation", and
"unserved household" have the meanings given those terms, respectively, in section
119(d) of title 17, United States Code, as in effect on the date of enactment of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992.
(3) (A) Within 45 days after the date of enactment of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, the Commission shall commence a rulemaking
proceeding to establish regulations to govern the exercise by television broadcast
stations of the right to grant retransmission consent under this subsection and of the
right to signal carriage under section 614, and such other regulations as are necessary
to administer the limitations contained in paragraph (2). The Commission shall consider
in such proceeding the impact that the grant of retransmission consent by television
stations may have on the rates for the basic service tier and shall ensure that the
regulations prescribed under this subsection do not conflict with the Commission's
obligation under section 623(b)(1) to ensure that the rates for the basic service tier are
reasonable. Such rulemaking proceeding shall be completed within 180 days after the
date of enactment of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992.
(B) The regulations required by subparagraph (A) shall require that television
stations, within one year after the date of enactment of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 and every three years thereafter, make an
election between the right to grant retransmission consent under this subsection and the
right to signal carriage under section 614. If there is more than one cable system which
services the same geographic area, a station's election shall apply to all such cable
systems.
(4) If an originating television station elects under paragraph (3)(B) to exercise its
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3. Senate Committee Report
The primary legislative origin of the retransmission consent provision
was in the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Because the Conference Committee report does not say much about the
reasoning behind the retransmission consent provision, the next best formal
source is the report of the Senate committee with jurisdiction. 6
Senator Daniel Inouye added the retransmission consent provision
during the full committee mark-up."7 In discussing section 15 of the
Senate bill, the Senate Committee based its reasoning in the actual wording
of section 325(a), which states that "nor shall any broadcasting station
rebroadcast the program or any part thereof of another broadcasting station
without the express authority of the originating stations."" 8 The Commit-
tee noted that the legislative history of the origin of this section-in the
Radio Act of 1927-indicated that this applied to "the wired wireless,"
which the committee understood to mean the radio predecessor of cable
television, as well as over-the-air broadcast stations." 9 Although recogniz-
ing that the FCC rejected this reasoning in 1959,120 the committee noted
right to grant retransmission consent under this subsection with respect to a cable
system, the provisions of section 614 shall not apply to the carriage of the signal of
such station by such cable system.
(5) The exercise by a television broadcast station of the right to grant retransmission
consent under this subsection shall not interfere with or supersede the rights under
section 614 or 615 of any station electing to assert the right to signal carriage under
that section.
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed as modifying the compulsory copyright
license established in section 111 of title 17, United States Code, or as affecting
existing or future video programming licensing agreements between broadcasting
stations and video programmers.
47 U.S.C. § 325(b) (1994).
116. S. REP. No. 102-92 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133 . The additional
views expressed by some members of the House Committee supporting retransmission
consent basically repeat the language given in the Senate Report. See supra note 110.
117. Allard, supra note 99, at 334 n.121. In April, 1991, BRDcST. noted the announce-
ment of the Inouye plan at a meeting of the National Association of Broadcasters. Kim
McAvoy, The Inouye Alternative: Must Carry or Retransmission Consent, BRDCST., April
22, 1991, at 29. A later article stated that S. 12, including the retransmission consent
provision, had the strong support of the "National Association of Broadcasters, network
affiliate organizations and CBS" and prospects for committee action looked good, despite
bitter cable opposition. Kim McAvoy, Going to the Mat over Tough Cable Bill, BRDCsT.,
May 13, 1991, at 27.
118. 47 U.S.C. § 325(a) (1994).
119. S. Rep. No. 102-92, at 34-35, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1167-68, see
supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text
120. CATV and TV Repeater Services Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403, paras. 65-68, 18
Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1573 (1959).
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that since cable systems compete with broadcasters for advertising revenues,
this treatment was no longer viable. Retransmitted broadcast signals are the
most popular programming carried on cable systems. Nevertheless, cable
operators "use these signals without having to seek the permission of the
Qriginating broadcaster or having to compensate the broadcaster for the
value its product creates for the cable operator."12' This created a "distor-
tion in the video marketplace which threatens the future of over-the-air
broadcasting."'" The present system requires "broadcasters [to] in effect
subsidize the establishment of their chief competitors."'" The committee
also stated that "the intent of S. 12 is to ensure that our system of free
broadcasting remain vibrant, and not be replaced by a system which
requires consumers to pay for television service."'2 4 In supporting the
reinstitution of the must-carry provisions, the committee relied on a
statement in the Communications Act of 1934 that "television broadcasting
plays a vital role in serving the public interest."'"
4. Congressional Debate
Statements made by members of Congress during the debate over the
retransmission consent provisions also yield some insight into the purposes
of the retransmission provisions. Upon initial consideration of S. 12, Senator
Ford (D-Ky.) stated that cable had become too powerful and specifically
supported the must-carry provisions.'26 This sentiment was echoed by
many of the bill supporters, while opposing members stated that passage of
the legislation would "cripple the growth of cable programming and service
options. 127
a. Senate Statements
Specifically regarding retransmission consent, Senator Inouye, who had
proposed the provision at mark-up, stated that retransmission consent was
121. S. REP. No. 102-92, at 35, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1168.
122. Id.
123. Id. See infra Part III.B.
124. S. Rep. No. 102-92 at 36, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1169.; see also THE
1992 CABLE ACT: LAW & LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 109, at 168.
125. S. REP. No. 102-92, at 41, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1174.
126. 138 CONG. REc. S408-09 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1992).
127. For the full detail of the congressional debate regarding the 1992 Cable Act, see 138
CONG. REc. S400-33 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1992); 138 CONG. REC. S561-611 (daily ed. Jan.
29, 1992); 138 CONG. REC. S635-97 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992); 138 CONG. REc. S711-70
(daily ed. Jan. 31, 1992); 138 CONG. REC. H6531-44 (daily ed. July 23, 1992); 138 CONG.
REC. H8671-87 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1992); 138 CONG. REc. S14,222-51 (daily ed. Sept. 21,
1992); 138 CONG. REC. S14,600-16 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992); and 138 CONG. REC. S-
16,652-77 and H1 1,477-88 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992).
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meant to allow broadcasters "the option of being treated like any other cable
programmer" and recognized that cable competes with broadcasters for
advertising revenue. Furthermore, the provisions would allow local stations
to control the use of their signals." The expectation was that, in most
cases, agreements would be reached under retransmission consent, thus
allowing parties to avoid "a complex set of governmental rules to promote
the carriage of local broadcast signals."' 9
Opponents argued that while on its face the provision sounded logical,
in application, it may cost cable customers more, and possibly deprive them
of broadcast signals. Senator Seymour (R-Cal.) urged the Senate to have
fuller hearings on what the potential effects of the provision would be oh
consumers and copyright holders. 3 ' Senator Timothy Wirth (D-Col.)
worried that the combination of retransmission consent and the must-carry
provisions may give too much power to the broadcasters.'
Nevertheless, general support for the provision was evident in the
Senate. A substitute amendment was offered for the bill by Senators
Packwood, Stevens, and Kerry, but contained a retransmission consent/must-
carry provision identical to the original. 32
b. House of Representatives Statements
Although the House did not have a retransmission consent provision
in its version of the 1992 cable legislation, a number of members did speak
in support of such a provision. 33 The members called it a "marketplace
mechanism that allows two business interests to try to reach an agree-
ment." 34  One member, Representative William Hughes (D-N.J.),
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Copyright-which had been
explicitly avoided by the proponents of retransmission consent-spoke in
opposition to retransmission consent, calling it a "broadcaster's Christmas
in July" which overcompensated for an admitted inequity. 3 Another,
Representative Mike Oxley (R-Ohio), noted the probability of the issue
128. 138 CONG. REC. S562-63 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1992) (statement of Sen. Inouye).
129. 138 CONG. REc. S643 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Inouye).
130. 138 CONG. REC. S639-40 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Seymour). See
also 138 CONG. REC. S640-41 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Breaux (D-La.)).
131. 138 CONG. REc. S659-60 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Wirth).
132. 138 CONG. REc. S694 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992).
133. 138 CONG. REC. H6490-95 (daily ed. July 23, 1992) (statements of Reps. Fields,
Eckart, Callahan, Holloway, Swift, Dreier, Chandler, Klug, Harris). The context was in the
rejection of an amendment to the rule on the bill which would have included the
retransmission consent provisions.
134. Id. at H6492-93.
135. Id. at H6495 (statement of Rep. Hughes).
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reappearing in conference, and regretted the fact that he could not oppose
the measure, which he claimed would cost consumers "$3 per head and
some $20 billion more."'136
c. Statements Post Conference
Statements in debate by senators and representatives after the
Conference Committee report included the provision, and arguments later
overriding Bush's veto, duplicated the arguments given before. Supporters
viewed the legislation as promoting competition between cable providers
and broadcasters while protecting consumer interests, whereas opponents
claimed that consumers would be harmed much more than proponents
claimed and that the legislation harmed the compulsory licensing scheme
constructed by the 1976 Copyright Act.'37 Others noted that questions
about the effect on the copyright compulsory license had not been
answered, partly because of the tactic of keeping the bill out of the House
Judiciary Committee.'38 Still others believed that the combination of must-
carry and retransmission consent gave the broadcasters too much of a
benefit.' 39
5. Hearings
Hearings also shed light regarding legislative intent, although they are
inherently limited as fora where interests often push their own views to be
sorted out by legislators. Two hearings were held in the 102d Congress
which have some bearing on retransmission consent. The Senate Subcom-
mittee on Communications, of the Commerce, Science and Transportation
Committee, held two hearings in preparation for consideration of S. 12, and
the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee, also held hearings. Since the later
Senate hearing before the same subcommittee 140 focused mostly on
questions related to the must-carry provisions, the discussion is focused on
the first Senate hearing.
136. Id. at H6507 (statement of Rep. Oxley).
137. See generally 138 CONG. REC. S14,601-16 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992). For two clear
statements of opposition, see 138 CONG. REC. S14,605-06 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini (D-Ariz.), Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Copy-
right); 138 CONG. REC. HI 1,483 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1992) (statement of Rep. Berman).
138. 138 CONG. REc. S14,610 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992) (statement of Sen. Seymour).
139. 138 CONG. REC. S14,245-46 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1992) (statement of Sen. Wirth).
140. Broadcasters' Public Interest Obligations and S. 217, the Fairness in Broadcasting
Act of 1991: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 102d Cong. (1991).
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In the first Senate hearing on March 14, 1991,141 the subcommittee
heard from both cable operators and broadcasters. The cable representatives
uniformly opposed S. 12, although little was mentioned in their prepared
statements regarding either must-carry or retransmission consent."
Senator Inouye did ask one of the panelists, James C. Kennedy, the
chairman and CEO of Cox Enterprises, what his position was on must-carry
and retransmission consent. Interestingly, Kennedy responded that:
[M]ust-carry is really a non-issue for me. As I said, every decent cable
company in America tries to provide the programming that their
customers want, and their customers want the over-the-air television
signals ....
[S]ome of the broadcasters are saying that [ 70 percent of the
viewing ... on a cable system is of over-the-air television stations.
Why could not that cable system pay the broadcaster for the right to
distribute that?
Well, if that is to occur, I think that broadcasters have to realize
that cable companies should then have a choice. They should not be
forced to pay for everything. They should be compelled to pay for the
programming that they want"
Senator Inouye followed up with a question to Ted Turner, president
and board chairman of Turner Broadcasting System, as to whether rates
would rise in response to retransmission consent. Turner expressed his
general opposition to the idea and noted that the costs would likely be
passed on to customers.'" Senator Packwood continued the questioning
of both Kennedy and Turner, noting with Turner that local network
affiliates had to pay to retransmit CNN satellite coverage of the Gulf War,
although cable operators can take the local transmission signal without
pay. 45 Later in the colloquy, James A. Mooney, president of the National
Cable TV Association, admitted that:
I think if you were going to invent these industries tomorrow... you
might say there is a kind of rough justice in the proposition that the
141. Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of1991: Hearings on S. 12 Before the Subcomm.
on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 102d
Cong. (1991) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
142. Somewhat ironically, one of the respondents, in arguing against mandated access by
others to cable programming, stated that "[t]here is no precedent in American business
practice or copyright law for forcing owners of intellectual property to sell their product to
all comers-especially their competitors." Senate Hearings, supra note 141, at 141 (prepared
statement of James P. Mooney, president, National Cable TV Association).
The omission of comments on retransmission consent are actually not all that surprising,
since Senator Inouye added the provision at the full committee mark-up. See supra note 117
and accompanying text.
143. Senate Hearings, supra note 141, at 181.
144. Id. at 181-82.
145. Id. at 187-89.
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cable operator ought to have to pay the local broadcaster for the
privilege [of] retransmitting the signal ....
I think whatever the theoretical free market attractions of that,
you really have to question the standing of the broadcasters to show up
at this point in history and all of a sudden want to get paid for the
cable operators doing what they used to insist the cable operators [do]
as a matter of law ... 146
The broadcasters expressed more clearly developed opinions on both
must-carry and retransmission consent. Edward Fritts, the president of the
National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) firmly requested the "right to
control the retransmission of [their] signal."147 James Hedlund, president
of the Association of Independent TV Stations, while firmly in support of
must-carry, stated that retransmission consent would likely favor the older
and stronger stations and could also make a bill too controversial to
pass.14 Upon further questioning, both Fritts and Hedlund stated that
broadcasters should receive compensation for the value they provide cable
operators. Fritts asked the subcommittee to add retransmission consent to
the bill. 49 Inouye noted at the end of the panel that he would be happy
to entertain suggestions for a retransmission consent amendment. 150
The House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance
hearings involved H.R. 1303, the original companion bill to S. 12.5 On
June 27, 1991, the subcommittee heard from representatives of both the
cable and broadcast industry regarding retransmission consent and must-
carry. Fritts, Mooney, and Hedlund, who had been involved in the Senate
hearings, were present, along with a number of others. Not surprisingly,
Fritts, representing the NAB, favored the retransmission consent provisions
asserting: (1) that the power of cable television had greatly increased, and
retransmission consent was necessary to level the playing fields; (2) that
retransmission consent was intended by the predecessor statute (section
325(a) and the Radio Act of 1927); and (3) that the cable industry's
arguments that retransmission consent and must-carry would give too much
146. Id. at 195.
147. Id. at 199 (statement of Edward 0. Fritts).
148. Id. at 200-05 (statement and prepared statement of James B. Hedlund).
149. Id. at 254.
150. Id. at 262.
151. Cable Television Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 1303 and 2546 Before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 102d Cong. (1991) [hereinafter House Hearings]. H.R. 1303 was replaced in
March, 1992 by H.R. 4850, which more closely followed S. 12, and which had already
passed the Senate. Randy Sukow, The Act's Aftermath: On to the FCC, BRDCST., Oct. 12,
1992, at 32.
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to the broadcasters or affect the compulsory copyright license were
wrong. 52 In regard to the compulsory copyright question, Fritts stated that
"[c]ommunications and copyright law have always recognized that there are
two interests intertwined in a broadcast signal--the interest in the signal
which belongs to the broadcaster, and the interest in the programs carried
on that signal which belongs to various copyright holders." ' 3
Mooney, representing the cable industry, was much more prepared to
oppose retransmission consent at this hearing, calling it the "free TV
surcharge" and labeling it as an attempt by CBS and broadcasters to add a
20 percent surcharge to subscriber bills. 4 Mooney noted that broadcaster
revenues far outweigh cable revenues and that the broadcast networks were
essentially asking to be bailed out of "poor business judgment." Mooney
observed that retransmission consent would conflict with the cable
compulsory copyright license, according to past opinions of the FCC, the
Copyright Office, and the Department of Justice. 55 James Hedlund, for
the Independent TV stations, reiterated his support for must-carry and
general support for a retransmission consent option, noting the relative
power of cable operators and the benefits of local broadcasters.15 6
Amos B. Hostetter, Jr., chairman and CEO of Continental
Cablevision, opposed the retransmission consent/must-carry package, stating
that CBS, the main proponent of retransmission consent, was the only
network which did not participate in cable. 57 He also noted that while the
broadcasters do not pay for their signal usage, cable operators must pay
franchise fees. Hostetter finished with the statement that "the CBS
retransmission consent/must-carry scheme is about putting more money into
the pockets of CBS by forcing cable consumers to pay extra for the very
same programs that they have already paid for through broadcast advertising
.... This is an incredibly cynical proposal. '15 8
Laurence A. Tisch, the president and CEO of CBS, responded with a
short statement which essentially repeated the NAB's arguments."5 9 Upon
questioning from Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.), chairman of the
panel, Tisch stated that he did not believe cable rates would rise as a result
152. House Hearings, supra note 151, at 752-76 (prepared statement by Edward Fritts).
153. Id. at 774.
154. Id. at 781-82 (statement of James P. Mooney).
155. Id. at 808-14 (prepared statement of James P. Mooney).
156. Id. at 856-63.
157. Hostetter noted that ABC was involved with ESPN and the Arts & Entertainment
Network (A&E), while NBC was involved with CNBC, A&E, and regional sports channels.
Id. at 938-42 (prepared statement of Amos B. Hostetter, Jr.).
158. Id. at 967.
159. Id. at 992-1001 (statement and prepared statement of Laurence Tisch).
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of retransmission consent, and cable operators would be willing to accept
a formula instead of negotiated deals.' 6° He further stated that the real
purpose of retransmission consent was to secure a place for free broadcast
television in the future of television.1
6 1
The panel also included statements by Henry P. Becton, Jr., of
WGBH-Boston, who expressed public television's support for must-carry
and opposition to retransmission consent's application to public televi-
sion,162 and Brian P. Lamb, of C-SPAN, who worried that must-carry
provisions would force cable systems to cease carriage of important cable
services such as C-SPAN because they would be crowded out by must-carry
stations. ' 6
3
C. FCC Regulations Implementing the Retransmission Consent
Provisions
The regulations promulgated by an agency implementing legislation
often give insight into legislative purposes. The FCC, as directed by the
1992 Cable Act,' 64 promptly instituted a rulemaking proceeding to
formulate rules for the implementation of the retransmission consent
provisions. 165 Although the rulemaking proceedings for the must-carry
regulations were conducted at the same time as the retransmission consent
proceedings, the FCC emphasized that this was a matter of convenience; it
should not be implied that the two provisions are not severable.'6In releasing final rules on March 29, 1993, the FCC made a number
of significant determinations.' 67 First, the FCC decided to apply the
retransmission consent provisions not only to television broadcast stations,
but also to radio and to Low Power Television Stations (LPTV). This
reflected the FCC's acceptance of the legislative history which tied section
325(b) to section 325(a)'s origins in the Radio Act of 1927 and viewed the
1992 Cable Act provisions as a "gap-closing" measure. 16 In regard to
160. Id. at 1002.
161. Id. at 1007-08.
162. Id. at 836.
163. Id. at 911-12 (prepared statement of Brian Lamb).
164. Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 6, 106
Stat. 1460, 1482 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(A)).
165. In re Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 8055, 72 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
255 (1992).
166. Id. para. 2.
167. In re Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 2965, 72 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 204 (1993)
(codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.64 (1994)).
168. Id. paras. 138-40.
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construing the exception applicable to some satellite carriers, the FCC noted
that the "overriding intent of the 1992 Cable Act was to increase-not
reduce-availability of broadcast signals to the public" 169 Further, in
unique circumstances where failure to reach a retransmission consent
agreement would leave an area without network service (such as in Puerto
Rico, where there are no local network affiliates), network affiliates could
not unreasonably withhold retransmission consent.170 The FCC also held
that retransmission consent applies to both distant and local signals,
although only local broadcasters have the option of choosing must-carry
coverage."1 The FCC decided that failure to choose either must-carry or
retransmission consent by the applicable deadline would result in must-carry
status for applicable broadcasters." This again reflects the general belief
that having more channels is better.
In regard to the compulsory copyright, the FCC stated that "[t]he
legislative history of the 1992 Act suggests that Congress created a new
communications right in the broadcaster's signal, completely separate from
the programming contained in the signal. 17 The FCC, however, stated
that broadcasters must bargain over only the signal right, and not for rights
in the individual programming, in regard to securing retransmission consent.
"Any bargaining must be for retransmission consent rights to the entire
signal."'17
4
Finally, although some had advocated direct regulation of the effect
of retransmission consent agreements on consumers' basic service rates, the
FCC declined to regulate this directly, stating that basic service rates are
properly regulated under section 623(b)(1).' 75 The FCC also prohibited
exclusive retransmission consent agreements between television broadcast
stations and cable operators. 76
Ill. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RETRANSMISSION
CONSENT
Parts I and II raise a number of arguments which have been used to
either encourage or discourage the application of retransmission consent to
cable system retransmissions of broadcast signals. This Part assesses many
169. Id. para. 147.
170. Id. paras. 145-46.
171. Id. para. 148.
172. Id. para. 159.
173. Id. para. 173.
174. Id.
175. Id. para. 176.
176. Id. para. 179.
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of these arguments. Some of the arguments which have been raised have
little foundation, while others raise valid concerns. Those arguments which
do cause concern are discussed more fully in Parts IV and VI regarding the
actual implementation of the 1992 Cable Act retransmission provisions.
However, before discussing these arguments directly, it is important to
provide some economic background to the cable and broadcast industries.
A. Broadcast and Cable Television Economics
The retransmission consent and must-carry provisions contained in the
1992 Cable Act modified the system of incentives present in the cable and
broadcast industries. Instead of being able to simply retransmit broadcast
signals without any further requirements, cable operators were forced into
a market where they needed to negotiate with broadcasters for the rights to
their signal. In order to understand the effect that this had, it is essential
first to explain the economics which relate to broadcast television,
specifically, the economics of public goods and of optimal product variety.
1. Public Goods
For most private goods, the purchaser of the good is the person who
is subsequently entitled to the consume the good; no other person can
consume the good at the same time (it is rivalrous) and others may be
prevented from consuming the good (it is exclusive). An example is an
apple. Public goods, by contrast, are nonrivalrous and nonexclusive; public
goods may be consumed by more than one person at once and it is difficult,
if not impossible, to exclude others from consumption. 77 Two prominent
examples of public goods are national defense and lighthouses. With
national defense, everyone is protected, regardless of who pays for the
protection. Many are protected at once, and people cannot be excluded from
its protection. Similarly, once a lighthouse exists, there is no way to prevent
a passing ship from using that lighthouse, nor is it only accessible to one
sailor at a time.
The problem with public goods is that because there is no relation
between purchasers and consumers, there are strong incentives to "free ride"
and not pay for the good. After all, if someone else builds the lighthouse,
anyone can still use it. This can lead to market failure where the private
market will likely produce an insufficient amount of the public good.'78
Market interventions, such as monopoly production (monopoly government
production in the case of national defense) or development of exclusion
177. See generally HARVEY ROSEN, PUBLIc FINANCE 64-88 (1992).
178. Id. at 75.
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mechanisms to deter free riders, are often necessary.' 9
Broadcast television is often described as a public good. 80 Some
economics textbooks and articles, in fact, use it as an example. 8 ' The
reasoning is as follows: once a television program is being broadcast, any
number of people in the broadcast area can watch the program simply by
turning on their television. There is no additional cost for broadcasting to
an additional household (nonrival) and there is no way to exclude
households (nonexcludable). One difference between the "pure" public good
situation and that of television is the requirement that each consumer own
a television. This does not solve the excludability problem, however, since
many may watch one television.
Few of the economic examinations note that provision of broadcast
television is actually two public goods problems wrapped into one. 82 The
first public good is the television programming. This is a public good in the
same sense that all authored works-such as books, movies, and works of
art-are public goods. The second is distribution. Both broadcast and cable
television distribution systems have an element of public good to them,
since the additional cost of another viewer is close to zero.
Traditionally, the problem of programming as a public good is the
kind of problem which is addressed through copyright. 83 Copyright is
economically rooted in the idea that creating a limited monopoly property
right for the creator of a work allows the collection of rents which will
encourage further creation.' 8' A number of commentators have questioned
the extent to which copyright protection actually has these effects, and the
179. Id. at 80.
180. BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO EcoNoMIcs 23-24 (1992).
181. See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 332, 335 (1958).
182. One important exception is OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 180, at 24.
183. See, e.g., Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Property, and the Right to Deny, 68 CH.-
KENT L. REV. 675 (1993); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970);
Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency,
Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989); Alfred C. Yen, The
Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connection Between Copyright and the
Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343 (1991).
184. The cost of producing a television program is independent of the number of people
who eventually see the program. OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 180, at 24. Since there is
much potential for free riding on the production of the programming, it is possible that
television programming is underproduced, i.e., more television programs would optimally
exist than the free market would provide. Besen, supra note 71, at 84. See also Brennan,
supra note 183, at 686-88; Gordon, supra note 183, at 1348-49 n.21.
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extent to which copyright should exist for various kinds of works. 5 It
suffices to say that the standard method for addressing the problem of the
public good aspects of creative works, including television programming,
has been copyright. Producers of programming have a copyright right in the
programs which are broadcast and they charge television stations for the
privilege of broadcasting the programming.'86
Distribution of television programming-for example, via broadcast,
cable or videotape--also has public good elements."s The least public
method of the three is videotape, since the owner may control who
watches. 88 Broadcast is the most public. As described above, anyone with
a TV can usually pick up the signal and view it without additional cost.
However, even broadcasters are capable of scrambling signals to make
reception more difficult. Cable distribution is somewhere in between, but
more likely closer to a public good. Provided that a house is already hooked
up to the cable network,' 89 there is a very low marginal cost to (a) turning
that connection on or (b) making sure that the signal gets to that house. The
latter, presuming a connection is already established and active, should be
pretty close to zero. Cable broadcasting does have the increased ability to
exclude. As any cable subscriber knows, it is much easier for cable
operators to exclude viewers either from the system entirely (for example,
if the bill is not paid) or from particular channels (for example, premium
channels). This allows cable operators, unlike broadcasters, to charge
viewers directly for their programming.
90
2. Optimal Product Variety
Another economic consideration which exists with television is the
185. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 183, at 292. Breyer's analysis, noting that much of the
protection which is intended for the author actually goes to the publisher, is particularly
relevant to cable television, since the actual creators of television programs have most likely
similarly ceded their copyright protection to the studios. Id.
186. Besen, supra note 71, at 83. However, in the context of cable television, it is
important to note that before the 1976 Copyright Act, the Supreme Court had stated that
retransmission of a broadcast by a cable system was not a "performance" for the purposes
of the 1909 Copyright Act and thus there was no copyright protection available in that
situation. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); see supra
notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
187. OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 180, at 92.
188. A videotape is similar to a book. While a book is not totally excludable-many can
read it-there is a much greater private quality to the medium.
189. And 96% presently are. See JOHNsON, supra note 2, at 150.
190. Owen and Wildman note that broadcast television basically operates by attracting
audiences which are sold to advertisers. Thus both the cost of the programming and of
transmitting the signal are paid for by advertisers. OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 180, at
92. See also infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
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concept of optimal product variety. Because the supply of programming is
constrained by the those who determine what programs will be shown on
broadcast stations or what channels will be covered on a cable network,
there is a question as to how many different programs, or alternatively, how
many broadcast or cable stations, there should be. While the instinctive
reaction is that more channels and entrants into any market is always better,
this is not the case from an economic point of view."' Suppose a product
has one possible differentiating characteristic-it can either be hot or
cold-and preferences for hot and cold products are roughly evenly
distributed. If two producers both make warm products, the benefits of
competition have been effectively foiled. Assuming some fixed costs of
production, society would be better off with one producer of the warm
product than two, because the additional fixed costs are wasted. 2
Similarly, if all programming were alike, it would be wasteful duplication
to have a variety of suppliers. 9 3 The optimal amount of product variety
must balance the added surplus (to both producers and consumers) from an
additional different product being introduced, against the fixed costs to
society which are required to produce that product. 94 The more substitut-
able products in a given market are, the more likely it is that the entry of
a new producer will add more to costs than to social benefits.'95
Owen and Wildman note that mode of television program delivery is
related to optimal product variety. 196 Owen and Wildman first survey
"program choice" literature which examines the effect of competition on
"program diversity." They note that early models showed that a benevolent
monopolist producing a diversity of programming would have a "socially
more beneficial program pattern" than a competitive television industry. 97
Owen and Wildman then extend these models to examine different modes
of program delivery. In their characterization, "pay television" is supported
by viewers that pay on a per program basis, while advertiser-supported
television exists by using programs to attract audiences which are "sold" to
191. OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 180, at 64-150; see F. M. Scherer, The Welfare
Economics of Product Variety: An Application to the Ready-to-Eat Cereals Industry, 28 J.
INDUS. ECON. 113 (1979), reprinted in F. M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SCHUM-
PETERIAN PERSPECTIVES 142-67 (1984). The idea of optimal product variety is rooted in the
idea of monopolistic competition. Id. at 142 (citing EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY
OF MONOPOLISTIC COM'ETITION (1933)); OwVEN & WILDMAN, supra note 180, at 108.
192. This type of analysis has been applied, among other things, to the two-party political
system. OwEN & WILDMAN, supra note 180, at 65.
193. Id. at 68.
194. SCHERER, supra note 191, at 147.
195. Id. at 148.
196. OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 180, at 65, 93-100, 107-31.
197. Id. at 68-84.
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advertisers. 98
Theoretically, in a pay television system there is more incentive for
those in control of program distribution (whether a cable operator or an
over-the-air broadcaster) to cater to the desires of a group of viewers.'
Thus, they conclude, a system of entirely "pay television is more likely to
allocate resources in television production efficiently than is advertiser
supported television[,]. . .[because] revenues per viewer under pay television
are more likely to reflect viewers' program preferences."200
Using more complex demand-estimation models and examining
different industry structures, Owen and Wildman find that a competitive pay
industry is almost always preferred to a pay monopoly and that pay
television is more likely than advertiser-based television to take into 'account
special or minority interests.0 ' Focusing on the ability of a pay television
industry to focus on special or minority interests, it follows that the less
substitutable programs are, the better a competitive pay television industry
does relative to advertising-based models.
Owen and Wildman create a theoretical model to assess television
industry market structure in terms of maximizing viewer welfare.02 In
comparing four modes of production--competitive and monopoly
advertiser-based programming and competitive and monopoly pay television
programming--they found that the likely best situation would not be all one
mode, but would contain a "mixture of [television programming] services,
including pure pay services, services supported by advertising only, and
program services supported by advertising and viewer payments.20 3
B. Arguments Regarding Retransmission Consent
A number of arguments regarding retransmission consent have been
made throughout the course of the eventual adoption of a retransmission
consent requirement. These arguments have run the gamut from ones which
focus on "unrecognized property rights" of broadcasters to those which
claim that consumers will be injured or that the delicate statutory compulso-
198. Id. at 92. "Pay television" is primarily cable television, where subscribers (viewers)
can be charged directly for the programming they receive. In practice, some cable channels
are pure pay television, such as HBO or Showtime, while other channels may derive revenue
from advertising as well as subscriber fees. Id. at 125. Broadcast stations are generally
viewed as entirely advertising-supported, but could conceivably, through the use of signal
scrambling, charge viewers directly like pay television if they so desired.
199. Id. at 95.
200. Id. at 98-99.
201. Id. at 124.
202. Id. at 119-24.
203. Id. at 131.
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ry copyright scheme will be upset. The remainder of this Part organizes,
presents, and critically examines eight of these arguments, five in favor of
retransmission consent and three opposed to retransmission consent. Some
of these arguments, upon close examination, have little substance; others
raise issues which should be considered as the implementation of retrans-
mission consent continues.
1. Arguments for Retransmission Consent
a. Retransmission Consent Recognizes the Property Right
Inherent in Broadcasters' Signal
One of the primary arguments for retransmission consent has been that
broadcasters have a property right in their broadcast signal and this right
was, before the 1992 Cable Act, infringed by cable operators who, without
authorization, could retransmit broadcast signals and effectively sell the
broadcast, packaged along with other broadcast and cable channels, to
subscribers for profit. This caused an alleged "distortion in the market-
place."2" This argument has been used by broadcasters throughout the
history of cable regulation." 5 This is also the argument to which broad-
casters appeal when they look to section 325(a) of the Communications Act,
which forbids other broadcasters from retransmitting signals.2 6 Finally,
rhetoric which discusses the "right to control the retransmission of [their]
signal,"207 clearly appeals to the idea of a property right.
There are two major reasons why this argument does not carry much
weight. First, the broadcaster has a limited right to broadcast by virtue of
a license granted by the government. For broadcasters then to claim that
they ought to be compensated when someone else actually extends the
quality or range of this signal overreaches significantly. Second, there is a
factual question as to whether the retransmission actually has any effect at
all on the marketplace, since broadcasters are normally compensated
through advertising, not by the recipients of the broadcast.
The broadcaster has a limited claim regarding a property right in the
signal because the broadcaster only holds a license to broadcast from the
government. The "policy of the [Communications] Act is clear that no
person is to have anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the
204. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
205. See supra Part I.B.1.
206. See supra notes 46-49, 118-25,152, 168 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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granting of a license. 2 °8 The broadcast spectrum is regulated to serve the
public interest and broadcasters have been granted a license when it is
determined to serve the public necessity.2 9 A cable operator, by retrans-
mitting this signal, does not decrease the value of this right. In fact, because
the value of the signal is dependent on the number of people who can
receive the signal, and because cable can only increase the number of
people who receive a signal, it seems more logical that cable retransmission
would increase the value of the original broadcast rather than decrease the
value. The cable argument that they have largely paid for their distribution
network (that is, the cable system and franchise fees to construct it) whereas
the broadcaster has been granted a right to at least an important portion of
their distribution network (that is, a license to use a portion of the broadcast
spectrum) has real power.210
If consumers paid for television signal reception directly, broadcaster
complaints that they are unfairly uncompensated might make some sense.
For example, if broadcasters generally charged each person who received
the signal one dollar (presumably to compensate for fixed costs, etc.), then
cable operators, after paying only one dollar, could easily charge a lesser
fee to redistribute the programming via cable. This could theoretically make
broadcasters unable to recover fixed costs. However, this is not the system
of compensation which exists for broadcast television.
Financing of broadcast television is accomplished primarily through
advertising; advertisers pay broadcasters to deliver an audience for their
advertising. Cable distribution increases the audience or signal quality for
an over-the-air program, and should thus increase the value of placed
advertisements, assuming that the cable operator is not allowed to remove
the advertisements. Advertisers would thus pay the broadcaster more to
compensate for the increased reach of the signal relative to the unenhanced
signal.2 ' There is no need for cable operators to compensate broadcasters
for the increased reach of their signal; broadcasters are already compensated
by advertisers. In fact, one could imagine situations where broadcasters
would want to pay cable operators to retransmit their signal in order to
212increase advertising revenues.
208. Brandywine-Main Line Radio v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940)), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922
(1973) (dealing with the suspension of a radio license under 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994)).
209. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1994).
210. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
211. To the extent that cable provides a competing advertising medium, compensation to
broadcasters could theoretically decrease.
212. See infra note 268 for an example of such a situation.
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b. Retransmission Consent Addresses the Public Good Problem
Posed by Distribution
As discussed above in Part rff.A.l., broadcast television has many
elements of a public good. One possible argument related to the argument
that broadcasters are not being adequately compensated for the use of their
signal, is that some sort of property rights allocation is necessary in order
to make sure that broadcasters receive appropriate compensation for the
production of this public good. This is not unlike the reasons which are
often given for copyright protection, which is the standard way of solving
the public goods problem for creative works.213
There are at least two problems with this justification for a retransmis-
sion consent provision. By making the analogy to copyright, retransmission
consent subjects itself to the same criticisms that have been made about
copyright protection. These criticisms make clear that property-like
protection is probably not necessary. A related argument is that the main
worry with public goods is the danger of underproduction. However, there
is no evidence that television is in fact being underproduced.
As Stephen Breyer states in his article examining copyright, "a large
difference between the cost of producing a work initially and the cost of
copying is not alone sufficient to show that copyright protection is
desirable.""21 In the world of retransmission consent, this translates to the
statement that the fact of a large difference between the cost of initial
transmission via broadcast and the cost of retransmission via cable does not
necessarily justify a property right on the part of the broadcaster. Breyer
asks a number of challenging questions regarding copyright protection, such
as whether allowing publishers to simultaneously produce an individual
book title would actually result in (a) a cost advantage to the copier and (b)
a reduction in the number of books produced.215 Breyer notes that while
a cost advantage may exist for the book copier, there are countervailing
forces, such as lead time and fear of retaliation, which could prevent a real
cost advantage 16 While these countervailing forces may not exist in the
world of broadcast retransmission, the economics of broadcasting similarly
indicates that retransmission does not necessarily harm broadcasters. For
213. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text. See also Daniels Cablevision v.
United States, 835 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1993) (finding the retransmission consent
provisions of the 1992 Cable Act to be similar to copyright protection and not constitutional-
ly violative of the First Amendment).
214. Breyer, supra note 183, at 344.
215. Id. at 294-99.
216. Id. at 300-01.
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example, the cost of broadcast television to viewers is zero. The fact that
retransmitters may have lower costs nevertheless makes it unlikely that
retransmitters will undercut the broadcasters' price to viewers. In fact, as
described above, the fact that the broadcasters receive payment from
advertisers for advertisement placement seems to indicate that retransmis-
sion could in fact enhance advertiser payments to broadcasters by creating
a larger receiving audience.
It is further not clear that a lack of property-like protection for
broadcast television would necessarily lead to a significant reduction in the
amount of television produced. Even if there was serious concern that
before retransmission consent there was not enough broadcast television, it
is likely that substitute products, such as cable-oriented television produc-
tion, would more than adequately compensate for the lack of broadcast
television in most markets.
c. Retransmission Consent Provides a Preference to Free Local
Broadcasting
One clearly stated concern in passing the 1992 Cable Act was the
desire to perpetuate free local broadcast television."7 The Act gives local
broadcasters a choice between choosing must-carry status, which forces
cable operators to retransmit their signal, or the option to enter into a
retransmission consent agreement. The FCC has consistently maintained that
there is an interest in preserving local broadcast television. 2 s David
Simon provides two arguments in favor of encouraging local broadcast
service.2 19 Simon first notes that many people may be left without
television service if local broadcast ceases, either because they are not
attached to a cable system or because they cannot afford cable's subscription
fee. He argues "it would be illogical for the government to pay.., the fees
for all who cannot afford them, when the alternative of free over-the-air
broadcasting is available." 0 Second, Simon argues that local news and
public interest programming in general would be harmed by proliferation
of imported signals.21 He notes the failure of a local origination cable
programming requirement in 1969.2z
217. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 2(a)(10), (12), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (1992).
218. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
219. David F. Simon, Local Television Versus Cable: A Copyright Theory of Protection,
31 FED. CoMM. L.J. 51, 68-71 (1978).
220. Id. at 71.
221. Id. at 62-65. See also Veraldi, supra note 58.
222. Simon, supra note 219, at 69-70.
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Both of Simon's arguments are persuasive, although less so than they
were when written in 1978. First, a much higher percentage of households
are presently able to obtain cable services?2 It is not necessarily true that
the demise of broadcast television would mean the end of television for
many households; many would simply switch to cable. Simon is correct in
noting that if television were viewed as a necessity and no broadcast
existed, there would be a need to subsidize those who could not afford the
cable subscription charge. However, this might not be the most efficient
way to provide television service if the services are available in other ways.
If the main good provided by cable service is television service, then the
cost to consumers is certainly lower if provided free over-the-air rather than
via subscriber cable service, even if subsidized.n 4
Simon's second argument, that broadcast television encourages the
"local character" of television, is also of ambiguous value. Although there
was not much local programming on cable systems in the late 1960s and
1970s, it is not true today. Cable systems in general have a much greater
capacity today than they did in 1978 and are more capable of complying
with local access requirements. Many franchise agreements, in fact, do
require local programming.' It is thus not completely clear that localism
is best served by local broadcast television. However, given that locally-
oriented broadcast stations presently exist, it may make sense to continue
this system rather than to construct new local cable channel providers.
More importantly, it is unclear whether the retransmission consent
provision will really have the effect of maintaining free local broadcasting.
While the must-carry provisions are expected to be utilized by the small
independent stations who will not likely be carried on a cable system,
retransmission consent is expected to be the choice of the larger and more
223. See JOHNsON, supra note 2, at 150.
224. Of course, it is debatable whether television service is the kind of necessity for
which the government ought to subsidize those unable to pay. Cable television may be
qualitatively different from other services which the government has urged to achieve
universal access, such as electricity or telephone service. The United States government has
encouraged extension of electricity and telephone services to hard to reach areas throughout
the last 50 years through the Rural Electrification Administration and other efforts. NTIA
REPO RT, supra note 1, at 291.
As cable services have begun to provide a greater number of services-such as
government information, educational services, world wide web access-it is conceivable that
cable service, rather than television service, could be viewed as the true essential service.
See id. at 285-315. On the other hand, technological innovations may eventually lead to the
availability of these services through phone lines and via cable networks.
225. Of course, regulations requiring access for local cable providers could be subject to
First Amendment challenges similar to those which have followed the must-carry regulations.
At this point, a stated governmental purpose of the must-carry regulations has been the
preservation of local broadcast television, not simply local needs. See infra Part V.B.
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established broadcasters. 26 The status of large well established broadcast-
ers providing local programming is not realistically threatened by the
absence of retransmission consent. 27 These stations are also likely to be
local affiliates of national networks, which have only a small amount of
"local" character. Thus, although promoting free local broadcasts might be
somewhat important, it is unclear that retransmission consent effectively
accomplishes that goal.
d. Retransmission Consent Promotes Increased Diversity of
Information Sources
The 1992 Cable Act states that one of the aims of the Act is to
promote the increased diversity of information sources."2 In implementing
the Act, the FCC also stated that the "overriding intent of the 1992 Cable
Act was to increase-not reduce-availability of broadcast signals to the
public. '229 However, there is no reason to think a fortiori that the
imposition of retransmission consent should lead to increased diversity of
television offerings. The broadcasters to whom retransmission consent
applies are already producing a product; it is unclear why retransmission
consent should create more diversity.230 The must-carry provisions, on the
other hand, might very well encourage diversity on cable channels, since
this basically allows any broadcaster to opt for mandatory coverage on the
cable system.
Even so, the analysis of whether an additional channel promotes
diversity on a cable system depends on whether there is excess channel
capacity on a system. If there is excess channel capacity, then an additional
channel would seem to add, rather than subtract, from diversity. However,
if there is limited channel space, whether there is a net benefit to diversity
depends on whether the new channel is "more diverse" than the channel it
replaced. Because there are many reasons why a cable operator might take
226. Small Cable System Impact, TELEVISION DIGEST, Oct. 11, 1993, available in
Westlaw, 1993 WL 2881871. See also supra note 148 and accompanying text.
227. This has been an argument used by broadcasters regarding the must-carry
regulations. See infra Part V.B.
228. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 2(b)(1), 106 Stat. 1460, 1463 (1992) (stating that the Act should "promote the
availability... of a diversity of views and information").
229. In re Implementation of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992, Report and Order, 8 FCC Red. 2965, para. 147, 72 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 204(1993). See also supra note 169 and accompanying text.
230. In practice, retransmission consent has had a different effect. See infra Parts IV and
VI.
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on a certain channel,231 there is no reason to assume that the cable
operator will necessarily choose to take on the more diverse channel.
Thus there is no a fortiori reason to believe that retransmission
consent will lead to greater program diversity. Even if retransmission
consent leads to the introduction of new channels, this only necessarily
increases diversity on those cable systems with excess channel capacity. On
systems without excess capacity, the net gain to program diversity is
unclear.
e. Retransmission Consent Promotes Optimal Product Variety
Although this argument was not raised explicitly in consideration of
the 1992 Cable Act, a reasonable argument can be made that retransmission
consent, by providing support to advertiser-supported broadcast television,
does promote a more optimal product variety in television programming. As
stated above in Part I.A.2., the configuration of modes of distribution
more likely to lead to optimal product variety includes broadcast advertis-
ing-supported stations. Owen and Wildman clearly state that a mixture of
advertising and viewer payment-supported television is more likely to lead
to an optimal variety of programming than either of the other modes
exclusively.232 To the extent that broadcast television's very existence is
threatened by cable television and support for advertising supported
television is the same as support for broadcast television, retransmission
consent should lead to more optimal product variety. While the argument
above regarding free local broadcast television is susceptible to the assertion
that local cable channels can be just as local as local broadcast channels, the
argument for supporting broadcast television to promote optimal product
variety remains, since most broadcast television is exclusively advertising-
supported.
Thus, to the extent that the granting of a retransmission consent/must-
carry choice represents a distributive allocation to support broadcast
television, rather than the interests of either programmers or cable operators,
retransmission consent may encourage the continuation of advertiser-
supported broadcast television. This may move product variety closer to the
optimum by encouraging a mix of program distribution modes.
2 33
231. Examples include increased revenue, must-carry requirements, local access
requirements, or agreements which are incident to a retransmission agreement.
232. OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 180, at 131. See also supra note 203 and
accompanying text.
233. In their article reviewing the 1992 Cable Act, Donald Boudreaux and Robert
Ekelund ignore this possibility and the whole concept of optimal product variety, claiming
that "local cable operators-be they monopolists or not-have strong incentives in the
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2. Arguments Against Retransmission Consent
a. Retransmission Consent Interferes With or Undermines the
Compulsory Cable Copyright
One of the main arguments launched against retransmission consent
is that establishing a retransmission consent requirement will destroy the
cable compulsory license which is meant to provide compensation to
programming producers to resolve the standard public goods problem
dealing with the makers of creative works.2" William Patry, in his treatise
on copyright, states that "retransmission consent eviscerates the cable
compulsory license.... Retransmission consent further offends copyright
principles by permitting broadcasters to negotiate for and sell the copyright-
ed works of others--the program copyright owners-at free market rates,
while the programmers are relegated to a below-market compulsory license
fee., 235 The conference committee which reported the bill added subsec-
tion 6 to section 325(b), explicitly stating that the compulsory copyright
provisions were undisturbed.236
The conclusion that the addition of a property scheme (that is,
retransmission consent) on top of the cable compulsory licensing scheme
destroys the latter is unfounded. The amounts paid under the compulsory
licensing scheme are unchanged.237 If they were too low before, they
remain too low. The addition of retransmission consent may not help the
situation, but it seems odd to say that it destroys the former system. In fact,
absence of government regulation to carry the particular mix of programming that optimizes
consumer satisfaction. Thus, Congress need enact no statute, and the FCC need promulgate
no regulation, prescribing cable operator programming in the name of consumer welfare."
Donald J. Boudreaux & Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Cable Reregulation, 14 CATO J. 87, 97
(1994). This assertion appears to be in direct conflict with Owen and Wildman's more
extensive analysis.
234. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
235. PATRY, supra note 7, at 970; see also Murphy, supra note 21, at 266 (recommending
that the cable compulsory license be repealed and copyright protection be extended to
broadcast signals).
236. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
237. Some commentators did claim that full copyright liability, where cable operators
would have to negotiate with copyright holders (as broadcasters must under retransmission
consent), would have been preferable to the compulsory licensing scheme where a fixed
payment is set by formula. The implication is that full copyright liability would have in fact
better addressed the problems of both copyright holders and broadcasters. Besen et al., supra
note 71, at 85-86. See also Heller, supra note 71, at 550 (arguing for either retransmission
consent or full copyright liability--seeing no difference between the two--over compulsory
copyright). This claim is implied by a simple Coasian analysis stating that retransmission
consent and full copyright liability "are merely different approaches to creating property
rights in television signals." Id.
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commentators have shown that two schemes, one which assigns property
rights (such as full copyright liability or retransmission consent) and another
which assigns liability (such as the compulsory copyright system), are
theoretically equivalent.238 The addition of a property scheme to a liability
scheme (compulsory licensing) does not change this theoretical conclusion.
b. Retransmission Consent Needlessly Increases Transaction
Costs
A valid complaint does follow from the discussion of the difference
between property and liability rules, however. The equivalence between a
property and a liability scheme does not completely hold true when there
are significant transaction costs associated with one scheme.239 The cost
imposed by requiring broadcasters and cable operators to negotiate every
three years over retransmission consent could be quite significant. Although
this argument was not explicitly raised during consideration of the 1992
Cable Act, this is a significant concern.
c. Retransmission Consent Increases the Price of Cable
Television to Consumers
One argument which was constantly raised by opponents of retrans-
mission consent during consideration of the 1992 Cable Act was that
imposing a system of retransmission consent where cable operators would
have to pay broadcasters for the right to retransmit their signals would
basically result in a pass-through of the cost to cable customers. Regulation
that was meant to benefit broadcasters at the expense of cable operators
would really result in an additional cost for consumers. 20 Some broad-
casters disputed these claims, stating that cable operators could pay for the
increased costs out of reduced profits, and that any expense was worthwhile
to secure free broadcast television's place in the future of television.241
238. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. Rav. 1089, 1106-07 (1972); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rule Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109
HARV. L. REV. 713, 733-34 (1996). These articles show that a liability rule is simply a
different way of assigning rights and, by Coasian analysis, should result in equal efficiency
independent of the initial assignment of liability.
239. See Breyer, supra note 183, at 316-18. This argument was also made by Besen in
noting that transaction costs would likely be higher in a full copyright scheme as opposed
to the compulsory licensing scheme. Besen et al., supra note 71, at 86-87.
240. See supra notes 144, 154, 157-58 and accompanying text (statements of Ted Turner,
James Mooney, and Amos Hostetter, respectively, at Senate hearings).
241. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text (statement of Laurence Tisch at
House hearings). The economic answer to this question would depend on the elasticity of
demand for cable services. However, since demand for cable service is likely to be relatively
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The concerns regarding further impositions on cable consumers are
reasonable. Although basic cable rates were to be regulated under the 1992
Cable Act, it seems quite likely that operators would claim that the cost of
paying any retransmission consent fees was a cost of doing business that
ought to be reflected in their basic rates. Although it is possible that cable
operators had sufficient profits to pay a retransmission consent fee, there is
no reason to expect the cable operators not to try to pass this cost through.
C. Summary
Many of the arguments made during the debates leading to the
adoption and imposition of the retransmission consent provisions in the
1992 Cable Act, upon closer scrutiny in conjunction with the economics
surrounding broadcast and cable television, appear to be specious. In fact,
little support can be found for the main argument given in favor of the
provision, that there is an imbalance in the market because cable operators
are allowed to retransmit broadcast signals without compensating broadcast-
ers. Neither the argument in its simple form of claiming that there is an
imbalance, nor in its slightly more complicated form related to the public
good of television distribution, carries much weight. In the end, however,
some arguments for retransmission consent, although not highlighted in the
legislative history, do sustain a critical analysis. One is the argument that
broadcast television should be encouraged so that the variety of programs
produced will be closer to the optimal level. The argument that retransmis-
sion consent will promote free local broadcast television may also apply,
though it seems to apply with more clarity to the must-carry provisions than
retransmission consent provisions. The argument that retransmission consent
will lead to greater diversity of information sources seems afortiori unclear.
On the other hand, of the three arguments against retransmission
consent, two raise serious concerns. Although the argument that retransmis-
sion consent would conflict with the cable compulsory licensing scheme
does not have much validity, the arguments that retransmission will cost
consumers---either by making them bear the transaction costs associated
with the consent negotiation, or by making them pay higher costs to pay for
the actual costs of retransmission consent-are quite ominous. These
concerns should be kept in mind as Part IV examines what has happened
over the past three years under the retransmission consent provisions.
inelastic, it seems that, if allowed, cable operators would be able to pass much of the cost
through to consumers.
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IV. RETRANSMISSION CONSENT IN PRACTICE
Most earlier analyses of the retransmission consent provisions
contained in the 1992 Cable Act were, by necessity, preliminary. 42 The
FCC regulations implementing the retransmission consent provisions are just
over three years old. The first elections between the retransmission consent
and must-carry provisions occurred just over three years ago in October
1993. However, since another election period is occurring,243 it is highly
appropriate to review the results of the retransmission consent process since
1992. This Part is divided into three sections. The first section provides a
chronological history of the effect of retransmission consent on cable and
broadcasting industries. Second, legal issues regarding the implementation
of retransmission consent are examined. Finally, legislative responses to
retransmission consent are briefly examined. Because there have not yet
been comprehensive studies of the effect of retransmission consent on the
industry, this Part relies largely on industry news accounts.2"
A. Industry Effects
Retransmission consent, after the first election period, did not provide
one thing that the broadcasters, and CBS in particular, had desperately
wanted: it did not create a direct second stream of income. Those
broadcasters that chose retransmission consent-and most did, especially
among stations affiliated with major networks--received noncash compensa-
tion, such as access on the cable system for another station, if they received
any at all.245 Three of the four major networks used their affiliates to
leverage new cable stations onto the airwaves.
1. Initial Reactions
Even before the 1992 Cable Act finally passed through Congress, the
broadcasters, and in particular the networks, began to react to the prospect
of retransmission consent. In September 1992, Fox changed language in its
242. See, e.g., Allard, supra note 99; Murphy, supra note 21; Veraldi, supra note 58.
243. The rules promulgated by the FCC state that the second election, to take effect
January 1, 1997, must be made by October 1, 1996. 47 C.F.R. § 76.64(f)(2) (1995).
244. One exception exists. Nicole Fradette et al., Project, Regulatory Reform: A Survey
of the Impact of Reregulation and Deregulation on Selected Industries and Sectors, 47
ADmiN. L. REV. 461,587-604 (1995) [hereinafter Regulatory Reform]. This article similarly
examined effects by surveying news articles. Studying the effects of retransmission is also
complicated because many of the agreements reached under retransmission consent are
confidential.
245. It is possible that broadcasters did receive indirect compensation through additional
advertisements placed on the new channels.
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network-affiliate contracts to allow Fox "input" as to whether the local
broadcast station chooses must-carry or retransmission consent in its
negotiations with local cable systems. Fox also indicated that it thought
money received as a result of retransmission consent should be divided
among the network, the affiliate, and copyright holders.246
Other parties, including cable operators and copyright holders, were
quick to react. On October 12, 1992, Bob Thomson, senior vice president
of Tele-Communications Inc. (TCI), stated that the cable operator had "no
intention of entering into any agreements" with broadcasters at all.247
Copyright holders complained that they were left out of the process. For
example, Barry Meyer, executive vice president of Warner Bros., stated on
October 26 that copyright holders "are the orphans of retransmission
consent .... It is not the signal itself that is valuable-it's what the signal
3)248
carries....
2. Build-up to Negotiations
As broadcasters and cable operators began positioning in the spring,
the rhetoric changed somewhat. Cable operators declared that retransmission
consent would place upward pressure on cable rates.249 The FCC decided
that complete pass-through of retransmission consent costs would not be
allowed, making cash payments by cable operators less likely. 5 At the
same time, cable operators maintained that they did not want to voluntarily
drop stations currently carried. The cable operators stated they were open
to "imaginative solutions" from the broadcast industry251while reaffirming
their insistence of not paying any fees.252
Broadcasters indicated that the majority of local stations, especially
those affiliated with networks, would choose retransmission consent rather
246. Joe Flint, Fox Eyes Retrans Pie, BRDcsT., Sept. 28, 1992, at 5.
247. Joe Flint, Many Players Eye Retransmission Pot, BRDCsT., Oct. 12, 1992, at 3.
248. Joe Flint, Industry Leaders Debate Retrans Consent, BRDcsT., Oct. 26, 1992, at 46.
For a discussion of the validity of this argument, see supra Part II.B.2.a.
249. Doug Halonen, FCC Adopts Must-Carny, Retransmission, ELEC. MEDIA, Mar. 15,
1993 (citing James Mooney, president of the National Cable Television Association). See
supra Part III.B.2.c.
250. Jeannine Aversa & Rachel Thompson, Cash for Cany Seen Less Likely Now with
Rate Regs, MULTICHANNEL NEws, Apr. 12, 1993, at 32. This was a key decision by the
FCC. See discussion infra Part VI.A.
251. Joe Flint & Rich Brown, Time to Talk Turkey on Retrans/Must Cany, BRDCsT. &
CABLE, Mar. 15, 1993, at 6, 15.
252. Kim McAvoy, Ten TV Groups Ready to Talk Retrans, BRDCsT. & CABLE, May 3,
1993, at 18; Joe Flint, Viacom Says No to Retrans Payments, BRDCsT. & CABLE, May 24,
1993, at 66.
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than must-carry status.25 3 This partly reflected a desire to try to obtain
payments and partly a fear that the must-carry provisions would eventually
be overturned, even though the District Court panel found them constitu-
tional on April 12, 1993.2- 4 The exceptions were smaller independent
stations who opted for must-carry status.255
3. Creative Solutions
In May 1993, Fox first floated a creative solution that eventually took
greater hold. Instead of cash, Fox would accept access for a new basic cable
channel on the local cable system in exchange for the right to continue
retransmission of their local broadcast stations. Fox claimed that this would
help both cable operators and network broadcasters.256 This offer was
made possible partly because of the unique agreement the network had
negotiated with its local affiliates.257 TCI quickly accepted the offer,
making an agreement whereby Fox gave consent to carriage of its local
affiliates and TCI would pay Fox twenty-five cents per subscriber for the
new channel, of which either 7.5 cents or five cents plus 25 percent of the
new channel's profits would go to local affiliates.25 Fox eventually
dictated that its affiliates choose the retransmission consent deal, unless the
cable system had fewer than 1000 subscribers, in which case the network
required must-carry.25 9
NBC soon followed Fox's lead, although CBS was still focused on
obtaining cash flow.2' 6 One by one, deals duplicated the Fox model.26'
253. Jeannine Aversa, B'casters Want Hefty Cable Fees, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Apr. 26,
1993, at 48; Top 25 Groups Brace for Retrans Showdown, BRDcsT. & CABLE, June 7, 1993,
at 78-82.
254. See infra Part VI; see also Kim McAvoy, Loss of Must Cany Doesn't Worry
Broadcasters, BRDCST. & CABLE, May 23, 1994, at 58.
255. See, e.g., Ed Bark, Biggest Fight on TV Will Be Off Screen, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, June 21, 1993, at 1C, available in LEXIS, Tex Library, Dalnws File; McAvoy, supra
note 252. See infra Part V.C for a discussion of the must-carry provisions in practice.
256. Joe Flint & Rich Brown, Fox's Price for Retrans: A Cable Channel, BRDCST. &
CABLE, May 3, 1993, at 10.
257. Id. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
258. Joe Estrella, TCI Expected to Announce Deal with Fox for New Cable TV Channel,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 12, 1993, at 46A, available in Westlaw, 1993 WL 3776914.
259. Joe Flint, Affiliates Approve Fox's Cable Network, BRDCST. & CABLE, June 7, 1993,
at 16.
260. Rachel W. Thompson, NBC May Follow Fox Model on New Network, MULTICHAN-
NEL NEWS, May 24, 1993, at 64.
261. See, e.g., Times Mirror Broadcasting and Tele-Communications Inc. Reach
Retransmission Consent Agreements, Bus. WIRE, June 17, 1993, available in Westlaw,
Allnewsplus (TCI and Times Mirror agreement giving extra channel access); Joe Flint, TCI
Deals With Broadcasters Feature Second Channels, Must Cany, No Money, BRDcST. &
CABLE, June 21, 1993, at 6 (TCI and Chris-Craft/United Television, Times Mirror, Cox
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Even Turner Broadcasting, a major cable operator, sought a retransmission
consent deal for its TBS broadcast channel, in which it would receive
startup service for The Cartoon Network.2 62 A few smaller stations
negotiated cash deals,263 and many independent stations opted for must-
carry.2" Eventually, CBS, after trying late in the process to piece together
a proposal for an all-news network, caved in and granted one year's
retransmission consent unconditionally for the stations it owns.2 6
4. The Dust Settles on the First Round
When the dust had finally settled, 80 percent of all commercial TV
stations chose retransmission consent over must-carry. Ninety percent of
network TV affiliates chose retransmission consent, although only 20
percent of independent stations chose this route.2s Instead of a second
agreements); Rachel W. Thompson, More Ops Likely to Follow ESPN2 Deal, MULTIcHAN-
NEL NEws, July 19, 1993, at I (Continental and ABC/Capital Cities agreement on new
ESPN2); Joe Flint, Capcities, Hearst Opt for Channel, BRDCST. & CABLE, July 19, 1993,
at 6 (Continental and ABC regarding ESPN2); Viacom Keeps Fox in Cable Line-Up, PR
NEwswRE, July 30, 1993, available in Westlaw, Allnewsplus (Viacom and Fox); Joe Flint,
Capcities, Hearst Latest Retrans Deals, BRDCST. & CABLE, Aug. 9, 1993, at 12 [hereinafter
Flint, Capcities/Hearst Deals] (Jones Intercable, Sammons Communications and Multivision
Cable and ABC regarding ESPN2); NBC and Time Warner Cable Reach Retransmission
Consent Deal, U.S. NEwsYwME, Aug. 17, 1993, available in Westlaw, 1993 WL 7131138
(NBC and Time Warner regarding launch of America's Talking); Retransmission-Consent
Update, BRDCST. & CABLE, Aug. 30, 1993, at 10 (Continental agreement with multiple
station owner Scripps Howard to launch the Home & Garden Network).
It is true that the idea of trading cable access for retransmission was not entirely
unexpected. The idea had been mentioned in both House and Senate hearings regarding
retransmission consent. Senate Hearings, supra note 141, at 181 (statement of James
Kennedy, president of Cox Enterprises); House Hearings, supra note 151, at 763 (statement
of Edward Fritts, president of the National Association of Broadcasters). However, it seems
unlikely that anyone expected it in the magnitude with which it occurred.
262. John M. Higgins, WTBS Wants Retransmission Consent, MULTICHANNEL NEwS, June
21, 1993, at 1.
263. See, e.g., Flint, Capcities/Hearst Deals, supra note 261.
264. In June, a major cable operator claimed that they did not care too much about the
new network offerings so much as it disliked must-carry, "which forces cable systems to
carry 'fifth rate' broadcast stations at the expense of cable services such as C-SPAN2 and
Discovery's The Learning Channel." Harry A. Jessell, Cable Growth Inevitable, Say Turner,
Others, BRDCST. & CABLE, June 14, 1993, at 22 (statement of John Hendricks, chairman of
Discovery Communications).
265. CBS Grants One-Year Retransmission Consent, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 27, 1993,
available in Westlaw, Allnewsplus (statement of Laurence Tisch, chairman of CBS). CBS
eventually extended this consent for another year. Joe Flint, CBS Extends Retrans Deals,
DAILY VARIETY, Aug. 10, 1994, at 5. In 1995, CBS still had no deal for retransmission
consent. James A. McConville, CBS Still Working on Retrans, BRDCST. & CABLE, June 5,
1995, at 25.
266. Most Stations SeekPayforMust-Carry, S.F. CHRON., July 16, 1993, at C4, available
in Westlaw, 1993 WL 6416504 [hereinafter Most Stations].
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cash flow, new services exist on cable, most of them extracted from
multiple station owners and networks. Fox leveraged the introduction of fX;
ABC leveraged ESPN2; NBC leveraged America's Talking and renewals for
CNBC; and some local stations leveraged a new channel, a regional news
station, local news updates on cable news stations, or other specialty
stations.267 Few cable systems dropped significant broadcast stations for
a significant amount of time.21 Most of the networks, with the exception
of CBS, got something, although not necessarily the cash they had wanted.
Some cable networks insisted that they had been seriously injured. Brian
Lamb, CEO of C-SPAN, claimed that seven million homes lost C-SPAN or
C-SPAN2 as a result of must-carry and retransmission consent.269
5. Indications for Future Negotiations
In late 1995 and 1996, broadcasters began preparing for the next round
of retransmission negotiations. In December, Capital Cities/ABC announced
plans to launch a new cable news network to challenge CNN 0 NBC
announced the new MSNBC network and successfully managed to trade in
its retransmission consent deals for America's Talking in order to launch
it." CBS announced Eye on People, in a belated effort to leverage a
267. Joe Flint, Stations StayforNo Pay, BRDCST. & CABLE, Oct. 11, 1993, at 6. See also
Steve McClellan, Retrans Plans: Programming the New Channels, BRDcsT. & CABLE, Oct.
11, 1993, at 16 (listing 25 new local cable channels). One example of a specialty network
which made a healthy premiere as a result of retransmission consent is the Television Food
Network. Kim Mitchell, Are Viewers, Operators Hungry for Food Network?, MULTICHAN-
NEL NEvs, Nov. 15, 1993, at 22.
268. One counterexample is Corpus Christi, Texas, where the cable operator was forced
to drop all three networks. The cable operator received consent in November, when it agreed
to contribute to a scholarship fund. Doug Halonen, Justice Settles Corpus Christi Carriage
Dispute, ELEC. MEDIA, Feb. 12, 1996, at 2.
Another interesting case was that of WCSH-TV in Portland, Maine, where, after holding
out for cash for retransmission consent the broadcaster eventually paid the cable operator
in future advertising commitments to be put back on the cable system. Retrans Turnabout
in Maine, BRDcsT. & CABLE, Nov. 8, 1993, at 11. See supra note 212 and accompanying
text.
269. Thomas W. Hazlett, Changing Channels, REASON, March, 1996, at 37 (interview
with C-SPAN CEO Brian Lamb).
270. John M. Higgins & Richard Katz, Retransmission Playing Key Role in News Wars,
MULTICHANNEL NEWs, Dec. 11, 1995, at 1. John Dempsey, All-News Webs Eye Retrans
Rule, VARIETY, Jan. 1-7, 1996, at 61. Fox made a similar announcement. Higgins & Katz,
supra at 66. ABC soon abandoned this effort, Rich Brown, ABC Cancels News Network,
BRDCST. & CABLE, May 27, 1996, at 11, and Fox proved unable to create retransmission
deals. Continental, Comeast to Pick Up Fox News, MEDIA DAILY, Sept. 25, 1996, available
in LEXIS, FCC Library, Compub File (reporting that Fox was paying $10 per subscriber for
the cable operators to carry the channel).
271. NBC Proposed MSNBC Retrans Plan, BRDCST. & CABLE, July 15, 1996, at 16.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
channel272 but did not meet with much success.273 Local multiple station
owners have also prepared, sometimes making deals even before the
networks acted.274 Some local broadcasters may have applied for larger
Areas of Dominant Influence so that they have more leverage vis-a-vis
must-carry provisions .2' The NAB recommended choosing long retrans-
mission consent deals in case the must-carry provisions are struck down by
the Supreme Court.276
The cable operators, for their part, noted that they had previously
"got[ten] stuck" with poor-quality cable networks and were not necessarily
going to let it happen again.277 The cable operators felt that they had too
few slots available to accommodate the burgeoning number of channels.7"
The FCC also made a few statements regarding retransmission. In
November 1995, FCC Chairman Reed Hundt noted that the FCC should
make sure that broadcasters do not use retransmission consent to leverage
Advanced Television Signals.279 In June 1996, the FCC announced that
retransmission consent, as well as other rules, would apply to the new Open
Video Systems under the 1996 Telecommunications Act.8
6. What Effect?
One reasonable question is what effect the retransmission consent
negotiations actually had.8 One article assessed this question in terms of
consumer benefit and concluded that consumers received a greater variety
of channels without higher rates.28 Another commentator surmised in
272. Michael Burgi, Advice and Consent: CBS' Late Entry Into the Cable TV Game Will
Be a Test to See if Retransmission Consent Has Any Teeth Left, MEDIAWEEK, Sept. 2, 1996,
at 2.
273. CBS Cable Offering No Help to Affiliates, MEDIA DAILY, Oct. 3, 1996, available
in LEXIS, FCC Library, Compub File.
274. See, e.g., Rich Brown, Spartan Allies With HGTV, BRDCST. & CABLE, July 29, 1996,
at 45. (Spartan leveraging its own Home and Garden Channel before CBS had announced
its channel).
275. Cable Strength Cited, COMM. DAILY, Apr. 19, 1996, at 4. By increasing the Area
of Dominant Influence, which is the FCC-defined area within which a broadcaster may
demand must-carry status, a broadcaster would be able to force carriage on a greater number
of cable systems.
276. Id. See Part V infra for more on the must-carry provisions.
277. Dempsey, supra note 270, at 61.
278. Burgi, supra note 272.
279. Hundt Questions Need for FCC-set Minimum for HDTV Broadcasts, WARREN'S
CABLE REG. MoNITOR, Nov. 27, 1995, available in Westlaw, 1995 WL 11659038.
280. FCC Limits Cable Switches to OVS But Requires LECs to Meet Other Cable Rules,
CoMM. DAILY, June 4, 1996, at 1. [hereinafter FCC Limits].
281. See infra Part V for an analysis of how these effects did or did not reflect the
concerns expressed in the arguments discussed in Part III.B.
282. Regulatory Reform, supra note 244, at 603.
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1994 that the negotiations resulted in greater production of local television
news.
283
In some cases, broadcasters have benefited from the new channel
agreements. For example, some local weather channels started by LIN
Broadcasting have been profitable, as have some local news channels.2
On the other hand, some promised channels have yet to be launched.285
Small rural cable subscribers were likely the biggest losers. Because rural
areas have such a small audience, their advertising appeal is limited, and
this makes it difficult for a broadcaster to convince a cable station that they
should give something up in exchange for the right to rebroadcast the
signal. 28
6
A few other trends are also evident. Over the past two years, two new
networks have been established, the Warner Bros. television network (WB)
and the United/Paramount Network (UPN). These networks have organized
many of the independent stations who were unable to take advantage of
retransmission consent during the first round of negotiations. In some cases,
the new networks have targeted for affiliation the second cable channels that
were gained by broadcasters in the retransmission consent negotiations.
287
The new networks are both owned by programming producers (Warner
Bros. and Paramount) and likely see appeal in both the channel's broadcast
signal and the opportunity to quickly be on cable systems, either through
must-carry or retransmission consent.
B. Legal Effects
There have been two major areas of legal effect regarding the
retransmission consent provisions. The first includes constitutional
challenges to the retransmission consent provisions. The best known of
these is Turner Broadcasting v. FCC,288 which deals primarily with the
must-carry provisions."' An independent constitutional challenge to
283. Veraldi, supra note 58. See also Colman Price, Regional News on a Roll, BRDCST.
& CABLE, Aug. 26, 1996, at 48.
284. Steve McClellan & Rich Brown, Retrans Channels Prove Broadcaster Boon,
BRDCsT. & CABLE, March 27, 1995, at 18.
285. Id.
286. Small Cable System Impact, supra note 226.
287. See Every Day in Every Way, BRDCST. & CABLE, Aug. 30, 1993, at 58; Joe Flint,
Warner Eyes Cable For Fifth Net, BRicsT. & CABLE, Oct. 25, 1993, at 65.
288. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated and remanded, 114
S. Ct. 2445 (1994), on remand, 910 F. Supp. 734 (D.C.C. 1995), prob. juris. noted, 116 S.
Ct. 907 (1996). Oral argument was held Oct. 7, 1996.
289. See infra Part V.B. Turner Broadcasting involved retransmission consent only
because the plaintiffs have claimed that must-carry and retransmission consent are so deeply
connected that declaring must-carry unconstitutional would necessarily require a similar
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retransmission consent was raised and dismissed in Daniels Cablevision v.
United States,90 discussed below. A second area includes legal issues
regarding implementation of the retransmission consent provisions.
Although there have not been many, a few issues are emerging and worth
mentioning.
1. Constitutional Challenges
As expected, the cable operators wasted no time in challenging the
constitutionality of the 1992 Cable Act.291 Five lawsuits challenging
various sections were filed within days of the Act's passage.292 Although
both Turner Broadcasting and Daniels Cablevision challenged retransmission
consent, the three judge court severed the cases and took jurisdiction only
over the must-carry provisions.293
In Daniels Cablevision, the court considered challenges to a number
of 1992 Cable Act sections. With regard to section 6 (retransmission
consent), Daniels Cablevision had alleged that retransmission consent was
effectively a prior restraint on speech because it "places a condition on
[cable operators'] carriage of material that the broadcaster itself has placed
in the public domain." '294 Judge Jackson rejected this argument, referring
to the fact that Congress has authority to provide artists, including
broadcasters, with copyright protection for their work. "Congress clearly
could have amended the copyright law to provide infringement remedies for
cable retransmission of broadcast material. But it is not constitutionally
significant that Congress has done in the Cable Act what it otherwise could
have done in the Copyright Act." ' Thus Judge Jackson gave a copyright
rationale for Congress's ability to create retransmission consent.296
declaration regarding retransmission consent.
290. Daniels Cablevision, 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993).
291. In fact, the 1992 Cable Act had provided for expedited challenges to the must-carry
provisions. These challenges were to be heard by a three-judge district court panel and were
directly appealable to the Supreme Court. 47 U.S.C. § 555 (1994).
292. Nicholas W. Allard, Must Carry and the Courts: Bleak House, the Sequel, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 140 n.5 (1994).
293. Daniels Cablevision, 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993); Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC, 810 F. Supp. 1308, 1315 (D.D.C. 1992). As mentioned before, the court did
not sever the argument that retransmission consent (section 6) was unconstitutional as
unseverable from the unconstitutional must-carry (sections 4 and 5) provisions. Thus this
claim remains as part of Turner Broadcasting. See infra Part V.
294. Daniels Cablevision, 835 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1993).
295. Id.
296. See supra Part III.B.l.b, discussing the policy merits of viewing retransmission
consent as being analogous to copyright.
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2. Implementation Issues
A few legal implementation issues have arisen which could at some
point result in administrative or court action.
a. Antitrust
The specter of antitrust has been raised a number of times during the
retransmission negotiation process as broadcasters charge the cable operators
with collusion and vice versa. In August of 1993, before the October 6
deadline, Senator Inouye asked the Federal Trade Commission and the
Justice Department to look into whether the cable operators had colluded
in arriving at a no cash payment position.297 The cable operators
suggested that the broadcasters were in collusion, noting that the NAB
convention had a session on how to conduct retransmission consent
negotiations. 29'
In fact, the only reported action has been against broadcasters. In early
1996, the Justice Department signed a consent decree with the three Corpus
Christi, Texas stations that had actually been removed from cable systems
after the first round of negotiations.2" The Justice Department claimed
that the stations "promised each other that they wouldn't formally sign
retransmission consent deals with local cable operators until others signed
deals" and that the stations promised not to sign agreements that gave them
an edge over the others. Although maintaining that they thought they had
done no wrong, the stations agreed to the consent decree, which promised
not to band together in future negotiations. The consent decree was meant
to be a "warning to broadcast stations ... as they begin this year's
retransmission negotiations.1300 The boundaries of a acceptable discussions
are still not clear.30
b. The Case of WOOD
Another interesting situation occurred in the case of WOOD-TV in
Grand Rapids, Michigan. WOOD-TV (a LIN TV-owned NBC affiliate) had
a two-year retransmission agreement with Cablevision and on expiration
297. Kim McAvoy, Inouye Raises Retrans Antitrust Specter, BRDCST. & CABLE, Aug. 16,
1993, at 6.
298. Id. at 16.
299. Justice Dept. Says Stations Cooperated Too Much on Retransmission Consent,
COMM. DAiLy, Feb. 8, 1996, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 2365332.
300. Id. (quoting Anne Bingaman, U.S. Assistant Atty. Gen.).
301. Steve McClellan, How Do LMAs Affect Must-Carry Negotiating?, BRDCST. &
CABLE, Apr. 22, 1996, at 24.
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said it would renew only if Cablevision included its new 24-hour weather
channel. The cable operator refused. WOOD-TV responded by withdrawing
their retransmission consent. 2 The cable operator responded by stating
that since WOOD-TV elected must-carry status for Western Michigan
University's cable system within Cablevision's franchise area, Cablevision
must carry WOOD-TV to comply with federal law.3 3 The claim was that
since WOOD-TV selected must-carry status within the local area, and since
"the absence of an effective retransmission-consent election renders the
station a must-carry signal," Cablevision must carry the signal."° It is
unclear how this dispute was eventually resolved.
C. Legislative Effects
1. Introduced Legislation Regarding Retransmission Consent
Although a number of bills have been introduced to amend or repeal
the retransmission consent and must-carry provisions, none has yet made it
out of committee. Two bills were introduced in early 1993 to modify the
provisions. One would have required that program producers get a share of
retransmission deals by creating a copyright infringement for authorizing
retransmission without the copyright owner's consent. °5 Another would
have repealed retransmission consent outright.306 In 1995, a measure was
introduced which would have repealed the must-carry regulations, although
leaving retransmission consent intact.307
2. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
The Telecommunications Act of 1996,308 signed on February 8,
1996, does not directly affect retransmission consent or the must-carry
regulations, although it clearly may affect the cable and communications
industries. The Telecommunications Act, among other things, encourages
competition in the cable industry by repealing the telephone company-cable
cross-ownership ban. This means that telephone companies and cable
302. Joe Flint & John Dempsey, Cable Knocks WOOD, Grabs Signal, DAILY VARIETY,
Jan. 29-Feb. 4, 1996, at 80.
303. Must Carry: "I Got Your Cable Act, " Cablevision Tells WOOD-TV, CABLEFAX, Jan.
26, 1996, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 7056184.
304. John Dempsey, Weather or Not, Cable Puts WOOD Back on Menu, DAILY VARIETY,
Jan. 29, 1996, at 8.
305. H.R. 12, 103d Cong. (1993), reported in Randy Sukow, Retrans Consent Foes Quick
to Act in Congress, BRDcsT. & CABLE, Jan. 11, 1993, at 58.
306. H.R. 190, 103d Cong. (1993).
307. H.R. 525, 104th Cong. (1995).
308. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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operators can now legally enter each others' markets. The cable industry
will greatly change if increased competition exists. The Act does state that
the cable regulations, such as retransmission consent, will apply to
telephone companies providing cable-like Open Video Services. 09
V. THE MUST-CARRY PROVISIONS
In order to be complete, an analysis of the retransmission consent
provisions contained in the 1992 Cable Act must include some discussion
of the must-carry provisions.) 1 The must-carry provisions are closely
related to the retransmission consent provisions: section 6 makes explicit
that local broadcasters each have a choice to make between the two
sections.311 In essence this gives the broadcaster a property right, and the
broadcaster will either choose to charge the operator for the value of the
broadcast signal under retransmission consent (or equivalent compensation)
or force the operator to carry the signal. The broadcaster should only choose
must-carry when unable to otherwise receive equivalent value through
retransmission consent. As might be expected from this description, the
great majority (80 percent) of stations chose retransmission consent. Ninety
percent of network affiliates chose retransmission consent over must-carry.
However, 80 percent of independent stations chose must-carry. For these
stations-the less powerful, more locally-oriented stations-must-carry was
the best option.312 This Part briefly examines the must-carry provisions
and describes how they relate to the retransmission consent. It also includes
a brief description of Turner Broadcasting v. FCC,313 the ongoing case
challenging the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions. However, this
Part does not purport to be a comprehensive explanation of must-carry; that
is best left for another article.
309. Id. sec. 301. § 651(a)(3), see. 302, § 653, 110 Stat. at 119, 121-24. In fact, the first
retransmission consent agreements between telephone companies and broadcasters were
recently reported. See Joe Flint, A Dodger Double Play, DAILY VARIETY, April 2, 1996, at
1.
310. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-35 (1994).
311. "[N]o cable system... shall retransmit the signal of a broadcasting station, or any
part thereof, except-(A) with the express authority of the originating station; or (B)
pursuant to section 614 [of the Communications Act of 1934 (must-carry)], in the case of
a station electing, in accordance with this subsection, to assert the right to carriage under
such section." 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1) (1994).
312. See supra Part IV.A.4.
313. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated and remanded, 114
S. Ct. 2445 (1994), on remand, 910 F. Supp. 734 (D.D.C. 1995), prob. juris. noted, 116 S.
Ct. 907 (1996). Oral argument was held Oct. 7, 1996.
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A. Justification
The justifications for the must-carry provisions primarily duplicate
those described in Part III.B. However, the must-carry provisions, more than
retransmission consent, do provide a clear preference to free local
broadcasting. By allowing any broadcast station--no matter how small and
unpopular--the capability to leverage themselves onto a cable system, thus
expanding their coverage, 14 must-carry clearly gives a great degree of
power to a broadcast station. This power clearly favors the local aspect of
the station; the station is allowed to claim must-carry status on any cable
operator in its Area of Dominant Influence. The power also favors the
broadcast aspects of the station; local groups who want cable channel
access may not use the must-carry provisions.
The arguments for why a local broadcast preference should exist are
discussed in the Part regarding retransmission consent.1 5 As mentioned
before, the actual benefit of free local broadcast is, of course, debatable. It
is possible that access to television service by subsidizing cable actually
would be more useful to consumers, although it may cost more to
implement. It is also possible that enhancing the local character of television
could be better accomplished via cable television systems. In fact, by giving
local broadcast preference on cable systems, it is possible that channels that
would otherwise belong to locally-oriented cable programmers are
displaced. Nevertheless, to the extent that free local broadcast television is
a priority, the must-carry provisions do appear to accomplish that goal.
B. The Constitutional Challenge
As mentioned above, must-carry regulations, when promulgated by the
FCC, were twice found unconstitutional in the 1980s.316 Therefore, it was
no surprise when cable operators quickly challenged the provisions again
in court when included in the 1992 Cable Act. 17 In Turner Broadcast-
ing,31 the cable operators challenged the must-carry provisions directly,
and the retransmission consent provisions indirectly as inextricably tied to
314. At least to those who subscribe to cable and never receive over-the-air broadcasts.
315. See supra Part III.B.l.c.
316. Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1169 (1986); Century Comm. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032
(1987).
317. See supra notes 291-93 and accompanying text.
318. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated and remanded, 114
S. Ct. 2445 (1994), on remand, 910 F.Supp 734 (D.D.C. 1995), prob. juris noted, 116 S.Ct.
907 (1996). Oral argument was held Oct. 7, 1996.
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must-carry.
The three-judge district panel first ruled on April 8, 1993, by a vote
of 2-1.They stated, ruling on summary judgment motions, that the must-
carry provisions (sections 4 and 5) did not violate the First Amendment 19
and explicitly did not reach the severability question as related to retrans-
mission consent (section 6).312 In finding that must-carry was constitution-
al, the court used the O'Brien test,321 which states that regulations will be
upheld when shown to promote a significant government interest and not
to burden substantially more speech than necessary.3' The court found
that the substantial interest test was satisfied by Congress's finding that
"concentration of economic power in the cable industry was preventing non-
cable programmers from effectively competing for the attention of a
television audience [and that] free local broadcast television [was] in serious
jeopardy.",3 3 The court noted that the 1992 Cable Act provisions were
"economic regulation designed to create competitive balance in the video
industry as a whole and to redress the effects of cable operators' anti-
competitive practices, ' 324 and rejected cable operators arguments that the
government's asserted interest was a content-based effort to "promote
widespread dissemination of information from diverse sources," especially
including local broadcasts.3z The court stated that local subject matter
was not a discrete content-based category.326 Plaintiffs further complained
that the factual premise that local broadcasting is in peril was incorrect. The
court disagreed. 327 Finally, the court found that the statutory provisions
were narrowly tailored to serve the purpose in sustaining local broadcast-
ing.32
The Supreme Court, in a fractured opinion, vacated the lower court
judgment and remanded for further proceedings. 29 The Court agreed with
the lower court majority that the must-carry restrictions were not content-
based,33' rejecting arguments that preference for broadcast was automati-
cally a content-based restriction,331 and affirmed that O'Brien provides the
319. Id., 819 F. Supp. at 36.
320. Id. at 38 n.10.
321. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
322. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 39.
323. Id. at 39-40.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 43 (citing the Federal Defendant's Memorandum).
326. Id. at 44.
327. Id. at 46.
328. Id. at 47.
329. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2451 (1994).
330. Id. at 2462.
331. Id.
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appropriate standard of scrutiny.332 The Court found that the governmental
interests at issue were (1) the preservation of free, over-the-air local
broadcast television, (2) promoting diversity of information sources, and (3)
promoting fair competition in the market for television programming. 333
The Court noted that "in the abstract, we have no difficulty concluding that
each of them is an important governmental interest."
34
At this point, the opinion dissolved into plurality. A four justice
plurality (continued by Kennedy's opinion) stated that "[the fact] that the
Government's asserted interests are important in the abstract does not mean,
however, that the must-carry rules will in fact advance those interests....
[The Government] must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not
merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms
in a direct and material way. '335 The plurality found that these require-
ments had not been satisfied,336 finding insufficiencies both in showing
that broadcast is in jeopardy and in showing that must-carry will force cable
operators to make programming changes.337 Justice Blackmun concurred
separately that a remand was necessary, although he would accord greater
deference to congressional findings.338 Stevens, although stating he would
normally vote to affirm the judgment of the District Court relying on the
Congressional findings, concurred with the judgment vacating and
remanding, in order to create a majority.339
Four Justices signed on to two parts of Justice O'Connor's opinion,
stating that "the Court is mistaken in concluding that the interest in
diversity ... is content neutral ' 340 and finding, as a result, that must-carry
is unconstitutional unless narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.
The interest in localism or diversity is insufficient.341
On remand, the District Court panel once more found, again on cross-
motions for summary judgment, that the must-carry regulations passed the
intermediate scrutiny test.342 However, this was only because of Judge
Jackson's decision to side with Judge Sporkin to avoid stalemate.343 The
332. Id. at 2469.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 2470.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 2472.
338. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
339. Id. at 2475 (Stevens, J., concurring).
340. Id. at 2477 (O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
341. Id. at 2478.
342. Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734, 751 (D.D.C. 1995).
343. Jackson would have brought the matter to trial. Id. at 752 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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court found that there was "'substantial evidence'.., from which [Con-
gress] drew a 'reasonable inference' that the must-carry provisions are
necessary to protect the local broadcast industry and do not burden
'substantially more speech that necessary."' This was enough to sustain
summary judgment for the Government,3 given that "intermediate
scrutiny does not require a perfect fit.
345
Judge Williams filed a lengthy dissent favoring the plaintiff motion to
dismiss, stating that "it is clear that must-carry is not narrowly tailored to
address any government interests that are actually at stake."3" Williams
noted that (1) there is no threat to the continued viability of broadcast
television, (2) it makes no sense to rely on the fact that must-carry will help
those it intends to help, (3) broadcasters clearly have other access to
consumers, and (4) leased access regulations could much less restrictively
allow all access to provision via cable.347 Among other arguments,
Williams noted that the stations that have selected must-carry [over
retransmission consent] are "marginal. 348 Williams also noted that must-
carry is more likely elected in an environment of scarce channel availability.
As he puts it, "Defendants implicitly claim that the First Amendment harm
to a programmer denied carriage in the first instance because of a cable
system's full capacity (partially thanks to must-carry) is somehow more
remote than the harm experienced by a carried programmer that is dropped
in order to make room for forced carriage of a broadcast station."349
Williams did not make any judgment as to the effect that declaring must-
carry unconstitutional would have on retransmission consent.
On October 7, 1996, the Supreme Court heard argument again in
Turner Broadcasting. In support of the must-carry regulations, Solicitor
General Walter Dellinger argued that the regulations were necessary to
maintain "a robust array of programming. 350 It was unclear from the
Justices' questioning which way the decision would likely go. The
composition of the Court has changed since the last appearance of the case
before the Court.
344. Id. at 739.
345. Id. at 751.
346. Id. at 755 (Williams, J., dissenting).
347. Id. at 755-56.
348. Id. at 770.
349. Id. at 780 (emphasis in original).
350. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup: Justices Skeptically Review Law
Requiring Cable Systems to Cany Broadcast Stations, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 8, 1996, at 22.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
C. Reflection Given Actual Experience
1. Justifications for Must-Carry
The analysis and experience discussed above in relation to retransmis-
sion consent is related to the issues discussed by the courts in regard to
must-carry. All three of the justifications recognized by the Supreme Court
as being governmental interests in regard to must-carry-(1) preservation
of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting diversity of
information sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for
television programming '-are also justifications raised in relation to
retransmission consent. Without making any judgment as to whether the
restrictions must-carry imposes are or are not content-based restrictions (and
thus whether the justifications must be narrowly tailored to address a
compelling state interest or merely substantially related to an important state
interest), these issues should be addressed.
First, regarding the preservation of free over-the-air local broadcasting,
it is apparent that local broadcast stations, at the very least, have more
clearly benefited from the must-carry provisions than the retransmission
consent provisions. While it seems the true beneficiary of retransmission
consent provisions have been the networks or larger groups of stations
which are able to leverage power to create new cable channels and
networks, the beneficiaries of the must-carry provisions have been local
independent stations. Must-carry status provided these local stations with
access to cable systems that retransmission consent alone would not have
accomplished. Indeed, without the must-carry provisions, the new channels
promised under retransmission consent agreements would likely have
eliminated any chance of carriage for these local stations. Judge Williams,
in his dissent to the District Court's opinion on remand, noted that the
stations electing must-carry are mostly "marginal." '352 The marginal local
broadcasters may be exactly the stations that the must-carry provisions were
meant to help.
The analysis of whether must-carry has promoted increased diversity
of information sources, like the question of whether retransmission consent
promotes increased diversity of information sources, relies on whether there
is excess channel space, and if there is not excess channel space, whether
the must-carry channels provide "greater diversity" than the channels that
they replace. If there is excess channel space, there would appear at least
351. Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2469 (1994).
352. Turner Broadcasting, 910 F. Supp. 734, 770 (D.D.C. 1995) (dissenting opinion of
Judge Williams).
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to be no loss to diversity as a result of carriage of an additional channel.
However, if there is limited channel space and a broadcaster opting for
must-carry takes the place of another channel, it is difficult to say whether
there is a net benefit. As mentioned above, C-SPAN, a cable channel,
claims that seven million homes lost access to at least some of its services
as a result of the must-carry and retransmission consent provisions.353 It
is unclear whether retransmission of C-SPAN or a local broadcast channel
choosing must-carry status would necessarily "create greater diversity."
Also, because of the way in which retransmission consent has been
implemented, with broadcast networks leveraging additional channels onto
cable systems, it is unclear whether the must-carry provisions or the
retransmission consent provisions should be held to blame for the loss of
diversity that results when a station is removed from a cable system (and
the gain from the addition of another "less diverse" channel)."
In regard to the third aim recognized by the Supreme
Court-promoting fair competition in the market for television program-
ming-it is unclear whether either the must-carry or retransmission consent
provisions address this issue. As described above regarding retransmission
consent,"' it is unclear what exactly the imperfection is in the market.
2. Severability of Must-Carry and Retransmission Consent
One issue that remains in Turner Broadcasting regarding the
retransmission consent provisions, although the more recent opinions have
not mentioned the issue, is the constitutionality of the retransmission
consent provisions as unseverable from the must-carry provisions, should
the must-carry provisions be found unconstitutional.356
From a textual perspective, the two issues do seem clearly severable.
The 1992 Cable Act provides must-carry regulations in sections 4 and 5,
while retransmission consent, and the choice between must-carry and
retransmission consent, is introduced in section 6. The language of section
6 states, in relevant part, that "no cable system or other multichannel video
programming distributor shall retransmit the signal of a broadcasting station,
or any part thereof, except (A) with the express authority of the originating
station; or (B) pursuant to section 614, in the case of a station electing, in
accordance with this subsection, to assert the right to carriage under such
section."3 Textually it is easy enough to simply excise subsection (B)
353. See Hazlett, supra note 269, at 37.
354. See infra Part VI.B.
355. See supra Part III.B.1.
356. Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 38 n.10 (D.D.C. 1993).
357. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1) (1994).
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and leave the retransmission consent provision.
In terms of the practical application of the provisions, the provisions
are similarly severable. Eighty percent of commercial broadcast stations
chose retransmission consent;.. to hold 80 percent of the commercial
broadcast stations hostage to the unconstitutionality of the must-carry
provisions which apply to 20 percent seems unnecessary.
Although this is not an argument for severing the provisions, but an
argument for preservation of must-carry, loss of the must-carry provisions
would seem to diminish the intended impact of the 1992 Cable Act in
promoting free local broadcast television. Retransmission consent may help
broadcasters relative to cable operators, but the must-carry provisions more
directly assist local and over-the-air broadcasters. Retransmission consent
has primarily functioned to help the broadcast networks and multiple station
owners leverage new offerings onto cable systems.
VI. REASSESSING RETRANSMISSION CONSENT
As the end of the first three-year election period between retransmis-
sion consent and must-carry comes to a close, the results have not been
quite what was expected. As outlined in Part IV, few broadcasters received
cash payments for their signals, although this was their primary intent.
Although 80 percent of broadcast stations chose retransmission consent, no
second revenue stream resulted. Instead, agreements concerning retransmis-
sion tended to provide access for additional cable programming provided by
broadcasters. Furthermore, although the retransmission consent provisions
provide a property right for the local broadcast stations which emit the
signals, the main beneficiaries of the retransmission consent agreements
seemed to be not local broadcast stations, but large broadcast networks and
multiple station owners, who found new avenues to expand their program-
ming. In some sense, retransmission consent actually provided the networks
with a major break into cable programming, rather than propping up local
broadcast.
This Part of the Ar icle reexamines many of the arguments discussed
in Part III and examines how implementation did or did not address these
arguments. Although there were a number of serious concerns regarding
implementation of the retransmission consent provisions---particularly
regarding the potential for cable operators to simply pass through the cost
of retransmission consent agreements to consumers-these concerns were
largely addressed by the FCC. As a result, the agreements reached by
broadcast stations took an unexpected form--the leveraged creation of new
358. Most Stations, supra note 266.
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cable products by the broadcast networks and multiple station owners.
While it is unclear whether these creations further any of the goals of the
1992 Cable Act, it is possible that the retransmission consent provisions
have solidified the role of broadcast television in the future of television
and thus supported the continuance of advertiser-based television program-
ming which is movement toward optimal product variety. Retransmission
consent may also have increased the diversity of information sources,
although this conclusion is most clear only where cable systems had excess
capacity. There have been a number of unexpected consequences as a result
of the retransmission consent provisions, and these may require further
study.
A. Addressing the Arguments Against Retransmission Consent
Although the overall results are not clear and may require further
study, at least one of the major compelling arguments against retransmission
consent-that this cost would be passed through to consumers-was averted
by FCC action."59 By announcing that cable operators would not be
allowed to incorporate retransmission consent costs into their basic rates, the
FCC explicitly avoided consumers bearing the burden for the new
provisions." ° Combined with the reluctance of cable operators to pay any
premiums to broadcasters, this action resulted in the creative deals for
additional channel access which characterized the first round of negotia-
tions.36" '
The argument that retransmission would unnecessarily increase
transaction costs is less clearly evaluable. Because these costs likely become
absorbed in the overhead costs of both the cable company and the
broadcasters, it would take additional study to determine both the magnitude
of the additional transaction costs resulting from retransmission consent and
the effect this has had on consumers. Since transaction costs could be quite
extensive, this issue should be examined further.
359. Because Part III.B.2.a. discusses why the argument that retransmission consent
would interfere with the compulsory cable copyright provision does not seem plausible, that
argument is not readdressed here.
360. Aversa & Thompson, supra note 250, at 32. The FCC did seem willing to allow
incremental increases in retransmission fees to be included in rates, so the future effects are
as yet unclear. Id.
361. See supra notes 256-69 and accompanying text.
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B. The Arguments in Favor of Retransmission Consent
In terms of the compelling arguments for retransmission,' 62 retrans-
mission consent appears to have had a marginally positive effect, although,
again, further study is warranted. Quite unexpectedly, in terms of promoting
a diversity of views and information, the creative solutions developed by
cable companies and broadcasters which leverage new cable channel options
have increased the diversity of programming offerings, at least where there
was previously excess channel capacity. In addition, retransmission consent
may have promoted advertiser-supported broadcast television over primarily
viewer-payment-supported cable television, which may have moved the
mixture of television products closer to an optimal variety. However,
whether the local character of television has been sustained is ambiguous.
New programming options have been created as a result of retransmis-
sion consent. A number of new cable television offerings have been
introduced as a result of the leverage available to broadcast television
networks and multiple station owners as a result of retransmission
consent.'6 As described above,"6 if there is excess channel capacity
then this clearly creates an additional diversity of programming sources
available to consumers. If there is not additional channel capacity then the
net gain to diversity depends on whether the leveraged channel is "more
diverse" than what it replaces. The extent to which leveraged channels
displaced other channels, and the question of whether this displacement
caused a net gain or loss to diversity is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, because it is likely that most cable operators did have excess
capacity, it is likely that there was some gain from these additional
channels. Any future analysis of the effect of retransmission consent on
diversity of programming should include examination of the results of the
must-carry provisions as well.
In terms of absolute support for free over-the-air local broadcast
television, the results of retransmission consent are ambiguous. Although
the provisions do, in name, provide a right to local broadcasters, the entities
most able to take advantage of retransmission consent have been the large
broadcast networks and multiple station owners, not local owners. These
networks and multiple station owners have used retransmission consent not
to foster over-the-air local broadcasts, but instead to create new channel
362. Because Part III.B.1. discusses why the property right and public good arguments
do not seem plausible, those arguments are not readdressed here.
363. See supra Part IV.A.4.
364. See supra Parts III.B.l.d, V.C.1.
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options that are distinctly nonlocal and oriented toward cable. At the same
time, because this increased leverage possessed by large broadcast networks
and multiple station owners has its source in the right provided to local
broadcasters, retransmission consent does at least forestall elimination of
over-the-air local broadcasting.
To the extent that one justification for retransmission consent is that
it will help broadcasters so that advertiser-supported (but not necessarily
local) television would remain viable, thus creating a more optimal variety
of television products produced, retransmission consent may have
accomplished its aims. Local advertising-based broadcasters, in the short
term, are more essential as a result of retransmission consent, if for no other
reason than because they provide needed leverage for networks to increase
cable programming. The long term effects, however, are certainly not clear.
C. Unexpected Consequences
The main unexpected consequence of retransmission consent has been
the domination of local interests by the interests of the networks and
multiple station owners. It is interesting to speculate how the recent
proliferation of new networks owned by program producers may have been
influenced by the obvious programming power gained by having a network
of local stations which can serve as leverage in retransmission consent
negotiations.' It is unclear to what extent the networks have reaped all
of the benefit from retransmission consent. It is conceivable that if, in the
long run, the foothold into cable programming created by retransmission
consent results in greater network emphasis on cable programming to the
detriment of their broadcast affiliates, then even the apparent gains in terms
of greater support for advertiser-supported broadcast television could be
undermined.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the retransmission consent provisions of the
1992 Cable Act. These provisions, like the must-carry provisions with
which they were paired in the legislation, have a long history in cable
regulation and were the subject of enormous controversy when they were
considered and passed. These provisions have a number of announced
justifications, some of which do not survive close scrutiny. However,
although -there were a number of good arguments against a retransmission
consent provision, in that it would unnecessarily increase transaction costs
365. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
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and could simply result in greater costs to consumers, there were also some
arguments in favor of a retransmission consent provision. In particular,
retransmission consent showed promise in increasing program diversity, in
preserving advertiser-supported broadcast television (and thus making
program variety closer to an optimal level), and to a lesser extent, in
promoting local over-the-air broadcast television in combination with the
must-carry provision.
The experience with retransmission consent over the past three years
provides mild optimism concerning the retransmission consent provisions,
although further study is needed in a number of areas. The FCC refused, in
its regulation of cable rates, to allow cable operators to pass through
additional costs as a result of retransmission consent to the consumers. To
the extent that retransmission consent has resulted in additional program
offerings that were not previously available, it seems likely that program
diversity has been enhanced. To the extent that supporting broadcast as an
advertiser-supported medium moves program variety toward the optimum,
retransmission consent may have also accomplished this aim.
However, other effects are not as certain. Although no comprehensive
study has been done of the magnitude, it is likely that transaction costs are
significant as a result of retransmission consent. It is unclear who bears
these burdens. Also, although must-carry provisions appear to directly
support the aim of local over-the-air broadcast television, it is unclear
whether retransmission consent significantly contributes to this aim. In fact,
in the sense that retransmission consent has helped networks further
dominate local affiliates and leverage themselves into cable programming,
it is possible that retransmission consent has in fact harmed local over-the-
air broadcast television. Particularly if the Supreme Court strikes down the
related must-carry provisions, this should be an area for further study.
As we enter into the second major election period for choice between
retransmission consent and the must-carry provisions, the FCC and other
policymakers should be aware of trying to make sure that retransmission
consent continues to support the justifications behind the provision. The
FCC should continue to forbid cable operators from passing retransmission
consent costs through to consumers. In addition, to the extent that the
preservation of local over-the-air broadcasting is a serious priority
(particularly if the must-carry provisions are declared unconstitutional),
policymakers may want to consider changes to retransmission consent or
other policies in order to foster this aim, rather than allowing the primary
beneficiaries of retransmission consent to be larger networks and multiple
station owners. At the same time, it does appear that retransmission consent
has increased program diversity and perhaps even improved the variety of
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programming by helping advertiser-supported television.

